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FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
by
Joseph W. McKnight*

I. STATUS
TNFORMAL Marriage. In Ortiz v. Santa Rosa Medical Center' both oral
and ritten evidence was offered to show that a man and woman had
epresented to the public that they were husband and wife. One of the
items of written evidence was the deceased woman's application for a life
insurance policy in which she stated that the man was her husband. On the
basis of precedent, that evidence standing alone would have been enough to3
2
present the issue of a public holding-out to the jury. Jackson v. Smith,
however, presented the appellate court with a closer evidentiary call. Jackson involved a dispute as to whether an informal marriage existed and, if so,
whether the alleged husband's naming his sister as the beneficiary of his lifeinsurance policy constituted a fraud on the community estate. The alleged
wife asserted that her alleged husband had procured her signature to the
application for the life insurance policy by fraud. Nevertheless she relied on
that very instrument, which both alleged spouses had signed, as evidence of
a public assertion of their marital union. Although this document was apparently the only evidence in the record of the couple's representation to
others that they were married, the appellate court held that the evidence was
4
sufficient to support the trial court's finding of an informal marriage.
Over a decade ago a Texas appellate court found a valid informal marriage in a peculiar conflict-of-laws context. 5 The couple had lived together
in Texas for several years in circumstances that would have produced an
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Blake Berryman in the preparation of this article.
1. 702 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. Persons v. Persons, 666 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), noted in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 1, 1 (1985) [hereinafter McKnight, 1985 Annual Survey]. The evidence of an
informal marriage in Oates v. Hodge, 713 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ), was

inconclusive, and the insurance policy in issue was not characterized as either separate or
community property of the decedent. Id. at 363.
3. 703 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).

4. Id. at 795. Rejecting the appellant-husband's motion for a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence, the Corpus Christi court of appeals in Hernandez v. Hernandez,
703 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ), made the telling observation that

the evidence was scarcely new, because the husband would have known of his own intention to
enter into an informal marriage at the time of the trial. Id. at 254.
5. Durr v. Newman, 537 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see Rodriguez v. Avalos, 567 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
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informal marriage except for the fact that the man had a living spouse. Section 2.22 of the Family Code 6 provides that if either party to a marriage has
a prior marriage that is not dissolved, a second marriage is void. 7 The section further states, however, that if the prior marriage is dissolved and afterwards the parties "have lived together as husband and wife and represented
themselves to others as being married," the second marriage becomes valid.8
Relying on the fact that the couple resided together as husband and wife
during a trip to another jurisdiction that does not recognize informal marriage, but after the impediment to marriage was removed, the Texas court
concluded that a valid marriage existed between them under section 2.22,
although the husband died during the brief sojourn outside Texas. 9 The parties were, nevertheless, domiciliaries of Texas throughtout their relationship.
In a decidedly different situation a federal court sitting in Nevada has relied
on this authority to find an informal marriage between domiciliaries of that
state (which does not recognize informal marriage), because of the couple's
brief cohabitation in Texas as husband and wife after a subsisting marriage
of one of them was terminated by divorce. 1° Rejecting the authority of a
Texas case that clearly demonstrates the error of this conclusion,"' the foreign federal court might nevertheless have relied on a New Mexico case that
supports its errant position.' 2
InterspousalImmunity, Loss of Consortium, and Wrongful Death. A spouse
may assert a claim for loss of consortium as an element of recovery for an
injury to the other spouse.' 3 In this respect, however, the Corpus Christi
court of appeals has reiterated the proposition that damages for loss of consortium are not measured by the injured spouse's inability to perform household chores and to participate in family-related activities.14
Ten years ago Bounds v. Caudle15 established the rule that a spouse sued
for a wrongful death willfully inflicted cannot raise the defense of interspousal immunity.' 6 The San Antonio court of appeals recently extended
the Bounds holding to cover causes of action for wrongful death as a result
of negligence. 17 Although one appellate court has held that the doctrine of
interspousal immunity is still applicable to a case of negligent injury not
6. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Vernon 1975).

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Durr, 537 S.W.2d at 326.
10. Orr v. Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 1510, 1514 (D. Nev. 1986).
11. Braddock v. Taylor, 592 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
12. In re Willard, 93 N.M. 352, 600 P.2d 298, 300 (Ct. App. 1979).
13. Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978).
14. Delta Drilling Co. v. Cruz, 707 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 666.
15. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).

16. Id. at 927.
17. Sneed v. Sneed, 705 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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resulting in the injured spouse's death,' 8 one wonders whether that precedent will stand in the light of this further breakdown of the doctrine. In a
concurring opinion in Stafford v. Stafford' 9 two Texas Supreme Court
judges took the opportunity of responding to an argument based on interspousal immunity to declare that the rule has wholly outlived its time and
20
should be abolished.
If the doctrine of interspousal immunity is disposed of, the way will be
opened to join actions for interspousal torts with suits for divorce. In Stafford no defense was raised on the ground of interspousal immunity. Without
severance the case went to judgment on both causes with the personal injury
suit tried to a jury and the suit for divorce tried to the judge without a jury.
Once the doctrine of interspousal immunity is put to rest, pleaders must still
bear in mind that all complaints that spouses may make against each other
do not necessarily constitute discrete causes of action. The point is illustrated by Cluck v. Cluck.2 1 In that case an ex-wife brought suit against her
former husband for what was termed "loss of consortium" but what actually
amounted to his affair with another woman. To be sure, the other woman
might have been proceeded against for alienation of affection, but the man's
consorting with his paramour did not constitute a distinct cause of action
against him on behalf of his wife. It was only an element of the damages she
had suffered as a result of the breakdown of her marriage, and the divorce
court had already considered that factor in making a property division in
22
favor of the wife.
Equal Protection. In spite of the view of three dissenting Justices, the United
States Supreme Court in Bowen v. Owens 23 concluded that Congress had not
violated the principle of equal protection in providing between 1979 and
1983 that a divorced widowed spouse of a wage-earner who remarriedafter
age sixty lost Social Security survivor's benefits, whereas a divorced, but not
remarried, surviving spouse was not so deprived. It was rational, the Court
said, for Congress to treat divorced, but not remarried, surviving spouses
differently from those who had remarried, because remarried divorced
spouses are generally less dependent upon the resources of their former
spouses than are surviving spouses who have not remarried. 24 The Court's
rationalization is hard to defend, and the reason for its nice distinction obviously did not convince the Congress, which rectified its earlier discrimina18.
n.r.e.).

Bruno v. Bruno, 589 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd

19. 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1987); see Price v. Price, 718 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1986, writ granted) (right to sue for premarital injury denied on the ground of interspousal immunity).
20. 726 S.W.2d at 15-17 (Mauzy, J., joined by Gonzalez, J., concurring).
21. 712 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
22. Id. at 602. For discussions of related issues, see McKnight, 1985 Annual Survey,
supra note 2, at 4-5; McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 131, 168 (1984) [hereinafter McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey].

23. 106 S. Ct. 1881, 90 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1986).
24. Id. at 1886, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 324-25.
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tory rule in 1983.25
II.

CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY INTERESTS

PremaritalAgreement. In Williams v. Williams 26 the wife in a divorce pro-

ceeding alleged that a premarital agreement entered into on the day before
marriage was procured by fraud, duress, and overreaching. 2 7 According to
the husband's testimony, he reminded his wife-to-be that they had previously discussed entering into a premarital agreement by which the income

and increases of the separate estate of each would be the separate property of
each, when he presented her with such an agreement and asked her to execute it. The man further promised to execute a codicil to his will leaving all
his property to the woman if they were still married at the time of his death,
and several days after the marriage he carried out this promise. The woman
testified that although she did not like the agreement, she nonetheless agreed

to it because approximately twenty guests were expected at the wedding the
following day. Although the wife-to-be was not advised by counsel 28 in

making her decision, the trial court found that the husband had discharged
his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the wife knowingly entered into the agreement after giving informed consent and without
being subjected to duress. She was sophisticated in matters of business and
was aware of the contents of the agreement when she executed it. 29 The
25. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 301(b)(l), 97 Stat. 65, 111
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 11 1984)).
26. 720 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Houston (14 Dist.] 1986, no writ).
27. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
28. See McKnight, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, § 5.45, 13 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 611, 783-84 (1982).
29. [A]t the time of the marriage [the wife] was an educated person who had substantial business experience. She had attended business seminars and training
seminars sponsored by the American Institute of Banking. Significant also is the
fact that [her] job exposed her to contracts which dealt with banking financial
records.... [An] assignment [by the bank by which she was employed] included
soliciting and reviewing the bids submitted for the furnishings and safety boxes
of a large bank and for moving the furniture from one location to another. The
fact that the president of the bank acted on her recommendation is an indication
of her business acumen.
Additionally, we note that [she] was also familiar with the contents of the
premarital agreement. She was of the opinion that the items designated in the
agreement as the respective separate property of herself and [the man she was
about to marry] were in fact their respective separate property at the time the
agreement was executed. [She] conceded that, at the time she executed the
agreement, she had no objection to the division of the property as set forth
therein. She did think, however, that the agreement put a romantic relationship
on a crudely businesslike basis. [The husband's] testimony disclosed that the
agreement was a condition of his pending marriage and further, that he was
motivated to protect his children by prior marriages.
We have considered the public policy in favor of such agreements in the
September 1, 1981 amendments to the Texas Family Code. Our courts have
construed the Family Code provisions as broadly as possible to allow the parties
flexibility to contract with respect to property incident to a marriage. Williams
v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. 1978). Considering the maturity of the
individuals, their business backgrounds, their educational levels, their experiences in prior marriages, their experiences with the sale of properties, their re-
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appellate court sustained the trial court's finding. 30
Community Presumption. Property acquired as separate property by a
spouse domiciled in another jurisdiction retains its separate character when
the spouse establishes a domicile in Texas, 3 although such property is subject to division on divorce if it would have been community property if acquired by a Texas domiciliary. 32 Once immigrants to Texas are domiciled
here, the community presumption as to their marital acquisitions prevails for
all purposes.3 3 Thus, among Texas domiciliaries the burden of proof is upon
the claimant of separate property to establish its separate character and to
rebut the presumption that all property acquired during a marriage or on
hand at its dissolution is community property. 34 Hence, the proceeds of sale
of a herd of livestock of a deceased spouse is considered community property
unless the community presumption is rebutted. A showing that the decedent
owned such a herd at marriage and the trial court's finding that there was no
net increase in the value of the herd when the marriage terminated do not
35
rebut the community presumption.
In Allen v. Allen 36 the wife had brought a separate proprietorship into the
marriage, which she continued to operate during marriage and then incorporated. Although it was asserted that the wife contributed no physical assets
to the corporation and that therefore only business goodwill was incorporated, the wife was nevertheless unable to show that the capital incorporated
was her separated property at the time of incorporation nine months after
her marriage. She therefore failed to overcome the presumption that the
37
corporation was community property.
Another case 38 addressed a post-divorce dispute as to entitlement to insurance proceeds on a set of table-silver stolen from an ex-wife. The divorce
decree awarded to each spouse so much of "the Estate of the parties" as was
in the possession of each. 39 Interpreting the division of "the Estate of the
parties" as pertaining only to the spouse's community estate the appellate
court concluded that there was an issue of fact as to whether the silver was
spective ages and further, their motivations to protect their respective children,
we do not find that the agreement in contemplation of marriage was obtained by
fraud, duress or overreaching.
720 S.W.2d at 248-49.
30. Id. at 251. In Miele v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Fla. 1986), the court
rejected an argument that a premarital agreement for a marital consideration constituted a
fraudulent transfer against the Internal Revenue Service, to whom the transferring party was
liable for taxes. Id. at 1000.
31. Estate of Hanau v. Hanau, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 442, 443-44 (May 20, 1987).
32. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
33. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 443-44.
34. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
35. Bobbitt v. Bass, 713 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
36. 704 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
37. Id. at 603-05.
38. McIntire v. McIntire, 702 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Id. at 288.
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community property or the ex-husband's separate property. 4° The burden
would be on the ex-husband to prove the latter assertion on remand.
Buck v. Rogers 4' concerned an ex-wife's post-divorce suit under a property settlement agreement providing that any significant undisclosed community property would be owned equally by the parties. In negotiating the
property settlement the attorney-husband failed to disclose his contingentfee interests in pending personal-injury claims of clients. The court held that
these contingent-fee interests were community 42
property and therefore that
the ex-wife was entitled to one-half their value.
Once it is established that property belonged to a partnership in which a
deceased spouse held a community partnership interest, the burden of proof
is upon the surviving spouse to show the value of that interest on dissolution
of the partnership due to the death of the spouse-partner if the amount
sought is different from that shown in the accounting of the firm. In Bader
v. Cox 43 the widow-executrix of an attorney, who was a member of a legal
partnership, sought the value of her deceased husband's interest in his law
firm. In this instance assets of the partnership included contingent-fee contracts with clients, and the value of these assets was at issue. It had been the
practice of the partnership to distribute profits derived from each contingent-fee case to the partners on a proportionate basis without regard to
which partner worked on a particular case. A majority of the court concluded that the same method of distribution should prevail with respect to
profits from all cases pending at the husband's death. 44 The court noted,
however, that "if the surviving partners expend a significantly greater effort
winding up the pending cases than they would have if [the] decedent were
'45
still alive, the method of distribution may unjustly favor [the widow]."
Hence, in making a partition between the firm and the widow, the trial court
46
would have to take such equities into account in favor of the partners.
In Bader v. Cox the court also discussed the doctrine of judicial estoppel
as it might have affected determination of facts at issue, though in that case
no estoppel operated because allegations that might have been asserted as
admissions barring the introduction of contrary evidence had been
amended. 47 In Roosevelt v. Roosevelt 4" the situation was different. In that
40. Id.
41. 709 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).

42. Id. at 286. The ex-wife also recovered her attorney's fees and exemplary damages for
fraud. Id. at 287. For another recent instance of the characterization of contingent fees in a
divorce context, see In re Garrett, 140 Ariz. 564, 683 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Ct. App. 1984); see
also J. MCKNIGHT & W. REPPY, TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAw 62-63 (1983); McKnight, Family Law: Husbandand Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 112-13
(1979) [hereinafter McKnight, 1979 Annual Survey]; McKnight, Family Texas Law: Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 114-15 (1978).

43. 701 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Id. at 683.

45. Id.
46.
6132b,
47.
48.

Id. (citing the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art.
§§ 5, 18 (Vernon 1970)).
Id. at 685.
699 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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case the wife in a divorce proceeding had listed a number of items of jewelry
in her sworn inventory and identified them as community property. Her
assertion as to the character of that property was, therefore, a judicial admission that was binding on her.49 Although the affiant offered no evidence or
argument to contradict her inventory, and although the husband's counsel
indicated that he had no objection to the court's awarding the jewelry to the
wife, the trial court's characterization of the property as her separateproperty was held to be reversible error. 50 Several months later, however, the
same appellate court seemingly held that it was harmless error for a trial
court to award military retirement pay to a pensioner because the court
thought that the pension interest was actually a divisible community asset. 51
If the appellate court's later decision is properly understood, it is difficult to
see how the award could be allowed to stand because the amount involved
52
could scarcely be regarded as trivial.
In Allen v. Allen 53 the parties had stipulated that the husband's retirement
plan was his separate property and the stipulation was not withdrawn.
Hence, the stipulation was binding on appeal just as it was before the trial
court. 54 The stipulation therefore constituted a judicial admission as to the

character of the property. 55
Joint Tenancy. Although no appellate court has analyzed the effect of the
November 1980 amendment to article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution5 6 on spousal attempts to convert their community property into a
joint tenancy by way of partition in a single transaction, 57 the Texas
Supreme Court held in Williams v. McKnight 58 in 1966 that Texas spouses
must first convert their community property to separate property before creating a joint tenancy of the property. 59 In Ossorio v. Leon 60 the San Antonio
court of appeals dealt with an agreement between Mexican spouses and a
Texas bank that the survivor of them should receive all money remaining in
49. Id. at 374.

50. Id.

51. Conroy v. Conroy, 706 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 1986, no writ); see
Allen v. Allen, 704 S.W.2d 600, 603 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (dictum).
52. See McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 22, at 162.
53. 704 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
54. Id. at 605.
55. Id.
56. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (as amended, 1980). for a discussion of November 25,
1980, as the effective date of the amendment, see McKnight, The ConstitutionalRedefinition of
Texas Matrimonial Property as It Affects Antenuptial and Interspousal Transactions, 13 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 449, 453 (1982).
57. In Maples v. Nimitz, 612 S.W.2d 690, 693 n.3 (Tex. 1981), the Texas Supreme Court
alluded to the 1980 amendment allowing interspousal partition of present community property
and future acquisitions in a way that suggested that the whole issue of interspousal partitions
might be subject to reexamination. The facts before the court, however, occurred prior to the
amendment. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
40 Sw. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1986) [hereinafter, McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey].
58. 402 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1966).
59. Id. at 507; see Warach & Wright, Money, Money, Who Gets the Money? Or Joint
Bank Accounts With Right of Surivorship, 47 TEX. B.J. 237, 238-39 (1984).
60. 705 S.W.2d 219 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
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their account. While the spouse's agreement did not purport to create a joint
tenancy in the strict sense, the mutual agreement between them and the bank
gave the survivor a right to the funds on deposit, and the appellate court
treated the right of the survivor as one of ownership, not merely a right of
access to the funds deposited. 6 1 The court held that in assessing the effect of
a transaction between spouses domiciled in Mexico and a Texas bank with
respect to Mexican community property, the law of the spouses' domicile
was controlling. 62 The spouses had opened an account in the bank in which
they deposited their community property accumulated in Mexico. The account in the names of both spouses was designated "Joint Account-Payable
to Either or Survivor." Under the law of the Federal District of Mexico
where the spouses were domiciled, the effect of the contract with the bank
was that the survivor would be the owner of the property. 63 The provision
for mutual survivorship to the funds in the account was therefore given
effect. 64
In FirstFederalSavings & Loan Association v. Ritenour 65 the husband and
wife had purported to partition their community property in December 1980
to create a joint tenancy in a bank's certificates of deposit. After renewing
these certificates the following year, the husband became concerned that his
wife might attempt to withdraw the funds unilaterally. After discussing this
concern with the bank, the husband (with the bank's advice) executed a
"hold" on the certificate so that neither spouse could withdraw the funds
unilaterally. Nevertheless, the wife thereafter substantially dissipated the account, and the husband brought suit against the bank under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act 66 for the amount of the funds withdrawn while the husband relied on the misrepresented efficacy of the bank's undertaking. The
bank in turn sought indemnity from the wife. The trial court ruled in favor
of the husband against the bank and in favor of the bank against the wife,
but provided that the two judgments should not be offset. On appeal the
Corpus Christi court held that the husband had standing to sue the bank
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and that the bank had no right to
67
recovery against the wife.
Apart from the husband's standing to sue and recover against the bank
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act in such a situation, the Ritenour
case is of interest mainly in its inferential definition of the incidents of a valid
joint tenancy between spouses, which all parties assumed that the agreement
with the bank created. Relying on authorities involving persons who were
not spouses 68 or were foreign spouses, 6 9 the appellate court in Ritenour con61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 222-23.
704 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

66. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon Supp. 1985).

67. 704 S.W.2d at 900.
68. Calvert v. Wallrath, 457 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex. 1970).
69. McCarver v. Trumble, 660 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no
writ) (spouses domiciled in Colorado who acquired Texas land as a joint tenancy), discussedin
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cluded that each spouse had full title to the property vis-A-vis the bank and
therefore the wife had the power to withdraw the funds. 70 Hence, the bank
could not recover from the wife for her depletion of the account. 7 1 It would
seem that the husband's recovery from the bank involving his loss of separate property would therefore have been a separate property recovery,
although the court did not discuss that point. If the court is correct as to the
wife's right to withdraw all of the funds, the husband had the same right.
After all, if the spouses had partitioned their community funds to create the
joint tenancy, as was assumed, each then had only separate property that
they used to create the joint tenancy in which they would continue to have
nothing except separate property interests.
This case illustrates that the true joint tenancy between spouses not only
fails to meet expectations of spouses but also those of third persons with
whom they deal. If by constitutional amendment 72 it becomes possible for
spouses to create a mere right of survivorship in community property without the creation of a joint tenancy for the purpose of achieving the right of
survivorship, some of these problems will be avoided. Even so, the question
will still remain whether a cause of action would arise under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act for a misrepresentation to a spouse with respect to an
agreement between that spouse and a bank by which the other spouse is
denied access to a joint account in the bank. As to community property on
deposit in a bank and subject to withdrawal by both spouses, that problem
already stands unanswered. Two possible situations raise this question. If
community property is deposited by the sole manager of it, and the other
spouse's right of access to the funds was created by agreement between the
sole-manager-depositor and the bank, the spouse who deposits solely managed community funds into the account ought to be able to change the
designation of the account unilaterally at any time so that the depositor
alone would have access to it. 7 3 If, however, the account is made up of

jointly managed community funds, either as a result of mixing or combining
solely managed community funds of the spouses74 or as a result of an agreement between the spouses to that effect, 75 one spouse's agreement with the
76
bank would not seem to preclude the other spouse's access to the account.
It is, therefore, open to some doubt whether a cause of action would accrue
to the depositing spouse who is misled by the bank into thinking that a unilateral "hold" might be put on such an account in this situation.
McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 22, at 143. Ossorio v. Leon, 705 S.W.2d 219, 222
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ) (spouses domiciled in Mexico who created a joint
tenancy account in a Texas bank), may now be cited for the same proposition.

70. 704 S.W.2d at 900.
71. Id. at 900-01.
72. The Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas has suggested that article XVI, § 15
of the Texas Constitution be further amended so that spouses may create a right of survivorship in community property.
73. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 5.22(a) (Vernon 1975).
74. Id. § 5.22(b).
75. Id. § 5.22(b),(c) and possibly § 5.22(a); see LeBlanc v. Waller, 603 S.W.2d 265, 267
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 1980, no writ); McKnight, supra note 28, at 754-57.
76. See Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. 1974).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

Reimbursement. A considerable lack of consistency prevails among the
courts of appeals with respect to the rules of reimbursement of one marital
77
estate for the benefits rendered to another. Following Vallone v. Vallone,
the Corpus Christi and Fort Worth courts have demanded specific pleading
of reimbursement, 78 whereas the Texarkana court seemingly relies 79 on the
concurring observation of a single judge in Jensen v. Jensen80 that the requirement should be dispensed with. Although the Tyler court adheres to
the strict-pleading rule enunciated in Vallone,8 1 that court pointed out that if
no objection to evidence of reimbursement is raised, that issue is properly
treated as tried by implied consent. 82 If in this instance the trial court
should grant leave to file a trial amendment to include a claim for reimbursement, the appellate court will not set aside the trial court's order on appeal
83
in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion.
In Zisblatt v. Zisblatt84 the husband, who acted as sales representative for
a number of manufacturers, conducted much of his business through a corporation of which he owned all of the stock as his separate property. During
his marriage he was thereby able to enrich his separate estate through his
ordinary business activities. Although the wife sought reimbursement of the
community estate for the enhancement of the husband's separate estate at
community expense, the trial court seemingly ignored the wife's plea and
awarded a preponderance of the marital acquisitions to the husband. Rather
than following Vallone and Jensen in remanding the case for a consideration
of the right of reimbursement, the Fort Worth court of appeals analyzed the
issue as one of characterization.8 5 The court supported this approach by
concluding that the husband's corporation was his business alter ego, and,
therefore, corporate assets were properly characterized as community property. 86 Disregarding the corporate entity and the facts found by the trial
court, the appellate court stated that the alter-ego concept provides an equitable basis for relief based on fraud8 7 and that it constitutes a ground for
recovery independent from reimbursement principles.8 8 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied heavily on the dissenting views rejected by the
77. 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982); see Paulsen, Jensen III and Beyond: Exploring the
Community Property Aspects of Closely Held CorporateStock in Texas, 37 BAYLOR L. REV.
653, 659-61 (1985).
78. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 703 S.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985,
no writ); Allen v. Allen, 704 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
79. Jones v. Jones, 699 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ), discussed
at greater length in McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 57, at 34.
80. 665 S.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Tex 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring).
81. Kamel v. Kamel, 721 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ).
82. Id. at 451-52; TEX. R. Civ. P. 301.
83. Kamel, 721 S.W.2d at 451 (citing Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 634
(Tex. 1986)); cf Morgan v. Morgan, 725 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
84. 693 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. Id. at 955-56.
86. Id. at 958.
87. Id. at 953.
88. Id. at 952.
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majority of the court in Vallone.8 9 Although in Vallone the Texas Supreme
Court did not discuss the alter-ego argument, there is no need for this alternative and conflicting approach.
Although not called on to apply the principle of reimbursement in Hernandez v. Hernandez90 because a claim was not asserted, the Corpus Christi
court went on to restate the principle laid down by the Texas Supreme Court
in Anderson v. Gilliland9 1 that the "amount of reimbursement for funds expended by [a marital] estate for improvement of another [marital] estate is
the measure of enhancement in value to the benefited estate." 92 The court
then observed that the trial court's finding that the community benefits of
sixteen years of rent-free occupancy of a separate home improved with community funds outweighed the value of improvements to the property and
therefore precluded recovery for reimbursement. 93 Relying on an earlier
opinion of the Corpus Christi court,9 4 however, the Texarkana court of appeals rejected the proposition that the value of community enjoyment should
be set off against the value of benefits received by a separate residence at
community expense. 95 In the case of community payment of taxes, insurance, and interest for the benefit of other separate property, however, the
Texarkana court twice reiterated the principle that an offset of community
benefits is appropriate.9 6 The Fort Worth court held in Allen v. Allen 97 that
because the claimant failed to make a precise showing of how much community property was used to benefit a separate land-holding and to show that
the amount expended exceeded the benefits received by the community, the
98
claimant had made no case for reimbursement.
These diverse opinions with respect to setoff of profits and the value of
enjoyment in cases of community claims for reimbursement against separate
estates raise fundamental questions concerning reimbursement in those instances. In the case of profits of separate property, the community estate is
absolutely entitled to them. 99 Why, then, should a community claim for
reimbursement be reduced by the amount of profits generated? Why is it
that if the benefit produces income, reimbursement is reduced, whereas if no
profit whatever is produced, there is recovery in full? In the case of enjoyment of a separate home by the spouses, the grounds for questioning the
concept of setoff are even broader. First, occupancy is an element of spousal
89. Id. at 952-53; see Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 466 n.9 (Tex. 1982) (Sondock,
J., dissenting).
90. 703 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
91. 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1985), discussed in Paulsen, supra note 77, at 722-23.

92. Hernandez, 703 S.W.2d at 252.
93. Id. at 253 (citing Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 319, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627 (1935)).
94. Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792, 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no
writ).
95. Smith v. Smith, 715 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
96. Id.; Nelson v. Nelson, 713 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
97. 704 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
98. Id. at 606-07.
99. De Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 23 Tex. 25, 27 (1859); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 5.22(a)(2) (Vernon 1975) (revenue from separate property is solely managed community
property).
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support required by law.100 Second, the court may order occupancy after
divorce as an element of child support,10 1 and at death the right of a surviving spouse to occupy the decedent's separate homestead is constitutionally
assured. 102 Why, then, is reduction of reimbursement granted in these instances? Finally, it may be noted that setoff of profits or value of occupancy
never applies in cases of claims for separate reimbursement against the
community. 103
The courts of appeals have also expressed diverse views of the relevance of
enhancement in value. While referring to the "enhanced value of the [benefited] estate" due to improvement, the San Antonio court of appeals in Carley v. Carley1 04 seems to understand enhancement in terms of the cost of
improvements rather than increase in market value due to the improvement.10 5 In the case of community discharge of a premarital separate indebtedness incurred for the improvement of separate realty, the Texarkana
court held in Nelson v. Nelson 106 that enhancement in value of the property
was irrelevant. What was paid was merely an indebtedness. 107
In Kamel v. Kamel1 08 the Tyler court of appeals reviewed a more complicated problem. The spouses had executed community obligations for the
construction of improvements on the husband's separate property. The
community, however, made no payments to discharge the indebtedness; it
was the husband's father who retired a substantial part of the debt. The
court concluded that the father's payment did not benefit the community but
constituted an equal gift to each spouse as separate property. 109 Hence, the
wife was entitled to reimbursement for her separate share contributed to the
discharge of the debt.110
In Smith v. Smith III a claim for reimbursement was asserted for improvements made at community expense for land of which the husband owned an
undivided one-half and leased the rest from his mother. The Texarkana
court was unwilling to upset the trial court's award of reimbursement for
enhancement of the entire property although the benefit was not shown to
100. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (Each spouse has the duty to
support the other). The fundamental relationship between the homestead concept and the
interspousal duty of support is illustrated by Schulz v. L.E. Whitham & Co., 119 Tex. 211,

216-17, 27 S.W.2d 1093, 1095 (1930), and Senegar v. La Vaughan, 230 S.W.2d 311, 312-13
(rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. 1977).

102. TEX CONST. art. XVI, § 52.
103. Hilton v. Hilton, 678 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no

writ).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

705 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
Id. at 374.
713 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
Id. at 148.
721 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ).
Id. at 452 (relying on Rogan v. Williams & Co., 63 Tex. 123, 129 (1885); Bradley v.

Love, 60 Tex. 472, 477 (1883); McLemore v. McLemore, 641 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. App.Tyler 1982, no writ)).
110. Id.

111. 715 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
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favor the husband's interest alone.1 12 As pointed out in Raulston v. Raulston,11 3 however, a community benefit conferred on a third person in such an
instance is a matter of constructive fraud and should be so evaluated before
11 4
applying principles of reimbursement.
III.

MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY

Disposition of Solely Managed Community Property: Constructive Fraud.
Although each spouse has the power of management, control, and disposition of all community property generated by his or her labor or separate
property,' 15 the disposition of the other spouse's interest in the property is
subjected to certain fiduciary restraints. Hence if the managing spouse disposes of some of the solely managed community property gratuitously,a presumption of constructive fraud arises as to the other spouse's half-interest in
the property disposed of.1

6

Further, the burden of proving that the dona-

tion was fair and reasonable is upon the disposing spouse or the donee. 117
Thus, if the husband buys a community life insurance policy on his own life,
as he did in Jackson v. Smith,' 1 8 and names his sister as the beneficiary, his
widow may assert a right to one-half of the proceeds. Because the sister
failed to introduce evidence of the total value of the community estate and
the proportionate value of one-half of the life insurance proceeds in issue,
she did not even begin to discharge her burden of proving that the widow
was adequately provided for with the rest of the community assets.' 19 The
widow was therefore successful in her claim to one-half of the proceeds of
the policy, and the decedent's one-half belonged to the designated
beneficiary. 120

If a spouse diverts community funds to benefit himself rather than a third
person at the expense of his spouse, the same analysis of rights should apply.
In Ashmore v. Carter12' the husband named his estate as the beneficiary of a
community policy on his life. In this situation, as in similar circumstances
when a constructive fraud is alleged, it was for the donee to establish that the
decedent's disposition of the widow's share of the particular community asset was reasonable under the circumstances. 122 Thus, the court seems to
have mistaken the burden of proof in reversing the trial court's award of
one-half of the proceeds of the policy to the widow.' 2 3 If, however, the de112. Id. at 157, 160 n.10.
113. 531 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ), The authority of McCanless v. Devenport, 405 W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1931 no wirt), cited by the
court in Smith is not convincing.
114. Raulston, 531 S.W.2d at 685.
115. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a) (Vernon 1975).
116. Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. Id.
118. 703 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
119. Id. at 796.
120. Id.
121. 716 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
122. Reaney v. Reaney, 505 SW.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
123. Ashmore, 716 S.W.2d at 174.
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ceased spouse disposes of his spouse's share of community property by will,
the choices open to her are somewhat different. If a testamentary provision
has been made for her of property to which she would not be otherwise
entitled, that disposition is construed as conditioned on her allowing the testator's dispositions of her property interests to stand. Hence, she is put to an
election to take under the will or to reclaim her property and forfeit the
testamentary provision made for her. 124 If no provision is made for her
under the will, the doctrine of equitable election is inapplicable, and she need
merely assert her right to reclaim her property interest. 125 In Robinson v.
Shelton 12 6 the husband had made a loan of community funds during marriage and forgave repayments in his will. This, then, did not constitute an
inter vivos constructive fraud but a mere disposition by will of one-half of
the debt. 127 In the absence of a testamentary provision for her, the provisions of the will did not put the widow to an election and her share of the
128
loan was not forgiven.
Liability of Spouses to Third Persons. In preparing the liability provisions of
the Family Code 129 the draftsmen thought it sufficient to define the sorts of
marital property that spouses' creditors might look to for satisfaction of particular kinds of debts and to assume that the general rules of law applicable
to a spouse's personal liability did not need to be explicitly stated except with
respect to the rules for the support of spouses and minor children.130 Because a number of appellate decisions indicate misconceptions about the general principles controlling a spouse's personal liability,' 3 however, the
Family Law Section of the State Bar has recommended clarification of the
Family Code in this respect.1 32 Nevertheless, the appellate courts have not
always misconstrued the draftsmen's intentions.' 3 3 The best recent exposition of those rules is in Justice Dickenson's brief opinion for the Eastland
court of appeals in Latimer v. City NationalBank.134 The husband defaulted
on notes he had made during marriage to a lender-bank, which thereupon
brought suit against the borrowing husband and his wife. The trial court
rendered judgment against both spouses, and the wife appealed. The East124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 144, 274 S.W.2d 670, 674-75 (1955).
Id., 274 S.W.2d at 674.
717 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1986).
Id. at 602.
Id.
129. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.61-.62 (Vernon 1975).

130. Id. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
131. See, e.g., Wileman v. Wade, 665 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ),
discussed in McKnight, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 15; Anderson v. Royce, 624
S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), commented on in
McKnight, Family Law: Husbandand Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 65, 76-

77 (1983) [hereinafter McKnight, 1983 Annual Survey]; Brazosport Bank v. Robertson, 616
S.W.2d 363, 366-67 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ), commented on in McKnight FamilyLaw: Husbandand Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 S.W. L.J. 97, 116-17

(1982) [hereinafter McKnight, 1982 Annual Survey].
132. See Tindall, Proposed Legislation in Family Law, 49 TEX. B.J. 1175, 1179 (1986).
133. See In re Karber, 25 Bankr. 9, 12 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
134. 715 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
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land court allowed the wife's appeal.135 Although the husband's obligation
was very clearly a community debt in that the creditor had not agreed to
look only to the husband's separate property for payment, such a description
of the obligation did not cause the wife to be personally liable for payment.1 36 If the wife were personally liable, the community property subject
to her sole management 37 and her separate property 38 would then be subject to seizure by the judgment creditor. The rest of the community estate,' 39 all of which in this instance was apparently subject to the husband's
sole or joint management, was nonetheless answerable in satisfaction of the
debt. 140
The cardinal rule of community management is that control is given to the
spouse whose efforts or property generate community profits. 14' In turn, the
rules of community liability generally follow those of management. 14 2 In
Keda Development Corp. v. Stanglin 143 a purchaser of community property
at an execution sale against the husband, in a last-ditch effort to save some of
the purchase from the husband's attack on the sale, attempted to rely on the
fact that the wife was not a party to the proceeding. The city had sued the
husband for an unpaid paving lien on property held in the husband's name
only. Judgment was rendered against the husband, and the property was
sold on execution. The husband later brought suit against the buyer on the
grounds of gross inadequacy of price and irregularity of the sale, and the sale
was set aside. On appeal, the buyer argued, inter alia, that because the property was community property, it was presumptively subject to the joint management of the spouses, and hence without the wife's joinder in the
proceeding the husband could only set aside the sale of his interest in the
property. In rejecting this argument the court first held that the community
property in issue was clearly not subject to the joint management of the
spouses because it was held in the husband's name only and a person dealing
with him could therefore rely on his power to deal with the property under
section 5.24 of the Family Code. 144 The court might have added that under
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 34.046145 a purchaser at an execution sale stands as a bona fide purchaser from the judgment debtor if he
135. Id. at 826.
136. Id. at 826-27.
137. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(b)(2) (Vernon 1975). The other rules of law there
referred to are those that apply when one spouse acts as agent for the other, including the
agency of procurring necessaries and in connection with partnerships and joint ventures. The
discussion of the point in Griffith & Dickey, Debt Liability of Marital Property in Texas, 14
COMM. PROP. J. 30, 38 (1987), is both too narrow and too broad. It is too broad in that the
Texas statute does not purport to refer to rules of federal law, though federal rules may also
constitute exceptions to Texas law. It is too narrow in its incomplete reference to agency
relationships.
138. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(a) (Vernon 1975).
139. Id. § 5.61(c).
140. Latimer, 715 S.W.2d at 827.
141. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975).

142. Id. § 5.61(b), (c).
143. 721 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
144. Id. at 904; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.24 (Vernon 1975).
145. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 34.046 (Vernon 1986).
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would have been such in dealing directly with the debtor. Thus, after having
relied initially on the husband's authority to sell the whole property, the
buyer was attempting to rely defensively on the husband's lack of authority
to sell the wife's share. The buyer was, in effect, attempting to assert for his
own benefit the wife's right to attack a sale to a bad faith purchaser. The
court further pointed out that in spite of the Texas Supreme Court's comments concerning the demise of the doctrine of virtual representation in a
situation involving jointly managed community property in Cooper v. Texas
Gulf Industries, Inc., 146 the principle is still applicable to cases of solely
managed community property and consequently it is carried over into the
context of liability when property held in one spouse's name only is sold to a
good faith buyer at an execution sale.
For the collection of delinquent taxes the Internal Revenue Code gives the
United States a lien on "all property and rights to property. . . belonging to
such person," 147 and that lien may be enforced by suit 148 or administrative
levy and sale. 149 The Code further provides that the Revenue Service has
the power to give to the buyer "all the right, title, and interest the party
delinquent had in and to the real property," 150 that is, to give a quit claim
deed of the taxpayer's interest. These provisions are ordinarily interpreted
as giving the Revenue Service access to the property interest of a taxpayer in
community property even if that interest is subject to the sole management
151
of the other spouse and thus is not subject to an ordinary creditor's claim.
Nevertheless, on a few occasions the Revenue Service has successfully asserted that it might seize more than the ownership interest of a taxpayer in
the community property if state law authorizes an ordinary creditor to do
so. 152 If the Service wishes to rely on state law in such cases, however, it
should sue as an ordinary creditor and, if successful, "exercise the usual
rights of a judgment creditor,"' 1 53 because administrative levy does not authorize such broad powers.
In Thomas v. Rhodes 154 a tax deficiency had arisen not from a couple's
failure to pay income taxes but from the husband's failure to discharge payroll taxes in the operation of his business. Evidently proceeding by way of
146. 513 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. 1974).
147. I.R.C. § 6321 (1986) (emphasis added).
148. Id.§ 7403.
149. Id.§ 6331.
150. Id. § 6339(b)(2).
151. Hollingshead v. United States, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9772 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
152. See Babb v. Schmidt, 496 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1974). There is little clarity as to
facts or holding in Short v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (E.D. Tex. 1975), but it
appears that the Revenue Service was allowed to seize the entire community property for the
husband's tax liability on the assumption that a husband's creditors under Texas law can reach
all community property, subject to an exemption in favor of the wife, which exemption is
inapplicable to the federal government. Though this might have been an accurate description
of Texas law prior to January 1, 1968, the law was radically changed at that time by the
passage of the Matrimonial Property Act of 1967, art. 4620, ch. 309, § 1, 1967 TEX. GEN.
LAWS 738, now codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975).
153. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 682 (1983) (citing I.R.C. §§ 6502(a), 7401,
7402(a)).
154. 701 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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administrative levy,155 the Revenue Service had seized and sold not only the
taxpayer-husband's interest in a particular piece of nonexempt community
realty but the interest of the nontaxpayer-wife as well. Asserting that the
Revenue Service could not seize and sell more than her husband's community half-interest in the property, the wife then brought suit in state court
against the buyer to reclaim her community half-ownership interest in the
land. The buyer did not rely on the right of the Revenue Service to reach the
community property subject to the husband's sole or joint management
under section 5.6 1(c) of the Family Code.15 6 Rather, he seems to have relied
on the fact that because the property was held in the name of the husband
only, the buyer could get good title to the whole of it as a bona fide purchaser
under section 5.24 of the Family Code.' 5 7 The Fort Worth court of appeals
concluded that the Service and the buyer should have been able to rely on
section 5.24.158 Such reliance seems wholly misplaced. The Service was not
"dealing with" the husband, as the statute provides, and neither was the
buyer. In a further effort to support its rejection of the wife's claim by showing that she was personally liable for the taxes, the court indulged in some
extraneous observations that the tax was a community debt, that the wife
was closely associated with the husband in his business, and that profits from
the business were reported in the couple's joint income-tax return. 159 These
comments did not help to clarify the legal issues involved. By holding, in
effect, that the purchaser at a federal tax sale gets not only what the taxpayer
had but also what the taxpayer could have sold to a bona fide purchaser, the
court gave an unjustifiably broad reading of the powers of the Revenue Service arising out of its administrative levy.
In Prewitt v. United States 160 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt
with a post-divorce federal tax sale. In that instance, however, the ex-wife,
as recipient of community property on divorce, had had an effective means
of protecting herself: recordation of the divorce decree under section
12.005(a) of the Property Code.161 Because the ex-wife was awarded community property and failed to protect herself by recording her interest, the
buyer of the ex-wife's separate interest at the Revenue Service's sale of the
former community property (still recorded in the name of the ex-husbandtaxpayer) was allowed to prevail. 162 Again, the holding of the court treated
the purchaser at the federal tax sale as though he was a bona fide purchaser
155. Under I.R.C. § 6331(a) (1986).
156. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975).
157. Id. § 5.24.
158. 701 S.W.2d at 945.

159. Id. The fact that the wife also signed the mechanic's lien contract and deed of trust is
relevant to the question of management, but management rights were not at issue. Counsel for
the wife added to the confusion by pursuing the argument that the property was subject to
joint management of the spouses in that the wife had previously joined the husband in executing a mechanic's lien contract and a deed of trust on the property.
160. 792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986).
161. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.005(a) (Vernon 1984).

162. 792 F.2d at 1356-58. Although the ex-wife moved to certify the question raised to the
Texas Supreme Court under TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-c, the Fifth Circuit court declined to
make the reference. 792 F.2d at 1359 n.6.
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163

164
Although many believe that the liability provisions of the Family Code
are too broad in making one spouse's solely managed community property
answerable for the tortious liability of the other spouse, 165 the State Bar has
not yet recommended statutory reform in this regard. All community property (however managed) is answerable for the torts of either spouse committed during marriage, but the separate property of the spouse who is not
guilty of tortious acts is not liable for the torts of the other spouse. 166 In
Traweek v. Larkin 167 the trial and appellate courts concluded that an exwife was not personally liable for her ex-husband's negligent act causing the
injury of a third person. Except for her presence when the accident occurred, the ex-wife had been in no way involved in the ex-husband's neglithe spouses, nor were
gent act. There was no agency relationship between
168
they engaged in a joint enterprise at the time.

In United States v. D.K G. Appaloosas, Inc.169 the federal government
sought the forfeiture of community realty because the couple had purchased
the land with the proceeds of the husband's illegal drug trafficking activities.
Without considering the authority of Amrani-Khaldi v. State, 17° in which a
Texas appellate court ordered a forfeiture of community property used to
perpetrate a state criminal offense, 171 the federal district court ruled against
forfeiture. 172 Although the federal authority only sought to seize the husband's interest in the property as it is also authorized to do for purposes of
satisfying federal tax deficiencies, the federal court held that the federal effort toward seizure failed because its objective could only be achieved by an
involuntary partition of the property contrary to state law.1 73 In AmraniKhaldi the Corpus Christi appellate court supported the state's seizure of the
wife's community interest as well as the husband's by referring to the husband's tortious liability that his criminal act included.1 74 Although the federal court could have relied on the supremacy doctrine to support the
seizure, the state court's analysis in Amrani-Khaldi still seems more appro163. 792 F.2d at 1358.
164. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(d) (Vernon 1975).
165. For a discussion of the alternatives considered by the draftsmen of the statute, see
Commentary to the Matrimonial Property Act of 1967, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1319, 1334

(1986).
166. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(a), (d) (Vernon 1975).
167. 708 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
168. "That [the husband] might have chosen another course had his wife suggested one
falls short of proving that he was subject to her control and hence her agent. The facts in
evidence fail[ed] to demonstrate a business or pecuniary purpose without which there can be
no joint enterprise." Id. at 946.
169. 630 F. Supp. 1540 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
170. 575 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ), discussed in McKnight, 1979 Annual Survey, supra note 42, at 149-50.
171. Amrani-Khaldi, 575 S.W.2d at 668-69.
172. Appaloosas, 630 F. Supp. at 1555.
173. Id.; see I.R.C. § 6321(a) (1986). In the Appaloosas case the court did not mention
whether the spouses claimed the realty in issue as their homestead.
174. 575 S.W.2d at 668.
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priate to the problem than does that of the federal court in Appaloosas.17 5
Interspousal Torts Affecting Property. In the usual course of events the willful act of one spouse in disposing of or destroying the separate property of
176
the other spouse gives the other spouse a cause of action for damages,
whereas similar treatment of the community interest of the other spouse
merely give a right to reimbursement. 17 7 If the property is insured against
wrongful taking or destruction, however, one may expect the insurer to raise
defenses to enforcement of the policy based on the marital relationship of the
perpetrator of the loss, even if the policy does not by its terms preclude
recovery in such cases. In 1952 the Waco court of civil appeals followed
precedents in other jurisdictions to enunciate a rule of policy (approved by
the Texas Supreme Court in rejecting the writ of error as "refused") that
when property is destroyed by a co-owner, the other insured owner cannot
recover.178 This conclusion stemmed from an argument rooted in the contractual nature of the relationship between the insured and the insurer: because the destructive co-owner-insured was mutually obligated under the
policy and could not benefit by his own wrong, the innocent co-owner was
also barred from recovery. The reasoning underlying the rule was therefore
dubious at best. In recent years, however, many American jurisdictions
have allowed the innocent co-owner to recover his share of the loss from the
insurer, 179 and the Texas Supreme Court followed their example in Kulubis
v. Texas Farm Bureau UnderwritersInsurance Co. 180 The husband and wife
were tenants in common of a mobile home that the wife's parents had given
to them. Hence each spouse owned a separate interest in the property. Both
spouses were named as insured parties to a policy of insurance against destruction of the mobile home. In a fit of anger the husband willfully destroyed the mobile home and all of its contents, and the wife claimed her
share of the loss from the insurer. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that
she should recover, because the innocent co-insured should not be punished
175. The federal judge cited no authority to support his conclusion.
176. Because the Texas Supreme Court has only recently lifted the bar to suit based on the
doctrine of interspousal immunity for willful torts, Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927

(Tex. 1977), there are no other authorities to be cited for this point.
177. Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (giving away community property); Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 339-40 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (squandering and wasting community property); see also
Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (fraudulently

secreting community property rejected as an independent cause of action in conjunction with a
divorce). A spouse's suffering loss by confiscation of community property should have the
same effect. See Amrani-Khaldi v. State, 557 S.W.2d 667, 668-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1978, no writ). There does not seem to be any appellate case in which one spouse was
charged with stealing the community interest of the other spouse. Nor is there any appellate
authority concerning a spouse's theft of the other spouse's separate property.
178. Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1952, writ ref'd).

179. Eg, Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 411 Mich. 267, 307 N.W.2d 53, 54-55 (1981);
Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121, 123 (1942); Hedtcke v.
Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 326 N.W.2d 727, 740 (1982).
180. 706 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1986).
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by being barred from recovery by the other spouse's act.18 1
The insurer in Kulubis apparently did not argue, as the insurer successfully argued in Western Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanchez,' 82 that the wife
should be precluded from recovering because the property was the couple's
homestead. But that additional consideration should not affect the innocent
co-owner's recovery. One may ask, however, whether the same result would
occur if the property were a community asset rather than the separate property of the innocent spouse. The court reserved that question for further
consideration. 183 If destruction of the innocent victim's community interest
gives that spouse a right of reimbursement against the wrongdoer, as it certainly should, there is no reason why the innocent spouse should not be able
to recover from the insurer rather than the wrongful spouse on dissolution of
the marriage. If the marriage is not dissolved, however, recovery from the
insurer in that instance requires the conclusion that the innocent spouse has
a cause of action for damages against the other spouse for destruction of the
innocent spouse's interest in community property. A comparable cause of
action has long been said to exist to set aside a fraudulent disposition of
community property during marriage.18 4 Hence, allowing the innocent
spouse to recover the value of one-half of the community property under the
insurance policy would not do violence to established concepts. Because the
recovery would be presumed community property if the marriage still subsisted, to make the property the separate estate of the innocent spouse it
would be necessary to conclude that the other spouse had forfeited his community half by his wrongful act, as indeed had already occurred.' 8 5 Nevertheless, in ruling on this very situation the federal court of appeals in
Norman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 186 did not embolden itself to
87
reach such a conclusion.1
The dispute in Crawford v. Coleman 188 arose out of two contracts of insurance on the life of a wife who was willfully killed by her husband. Hence,
the husband was denied the proceeds as primary beneficiary, leaving the
wife's parents as the taker of the proceeds under the terms of one policy and
189
the husband's son of a prior marriage as the taker under the other policy.
The Texas Supreme Court concluded' 90 that the proceeds of both policies
181. Id. at 955.
182. 671 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), criticized in McKnight,
1985 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 19-20.
183. Kulubis, 706 S.W.2d at 955.

184. Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211, 215 (1855); Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S.W.2d 1219, 1221
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, no writ); Bettis v. Bettis, 83 S.W.2d 1076, 1078 (Tex. Civ.
App.-E! Paso 1935, no writ); Moore v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 67 S.W.2d
932, 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934, writ dism'd by agr.); Coss v. Coss, 207 S.W. 127,
128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ).
185. Dickson v. Strickland, 114 Tex. 176, 205-06, 265 S.W. 1012, 1023-24 (1924).
186. 804 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
187. "We are not the custodians of Texas's community property law, however; and even
were we to conclude that such a rule would be a wise measure, confecting it would be an
improper exercise for us." Id. at 1366.
188. 726 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1987).
189. Id.

190. Id. at 10-11.
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passed under the provisions of section 21.23191 of the Insurance Code in
favor of the decedent's next of kin rather than under the terms of the policies. The dissenting justices pointed out, 19 2 however, that there was really
no difference between the terms of the policy and the effect of the statute as
to one of the policies. In the case of the other policy, giving the statutory
language precedence over the provisions of the contract required not only
overruling Deveroex v. Nelson 193 but also putting aside the terms of the policy that presumably expressed the decedent's wishes. 194
Homestead: Designation and Extent. In re Hunt,195 a bankruptcy case involving a homestead claim, is somewhat reminiscent of In re Claflin,1 96 because in both cases the issue was whether the homestead claimant had
abandoned a former home and established a new homestead elsewhere. Unlike the situation in Claflin, in which the claimant asserted that she had not
abandoned her first home, in Hunt the claimant insisted that a new homestead had been established by intent alone. While occupying their home in
Midland, the husband and wife executed a deed-of-trust note for $400,000 to
a bank and gave as security a home in Houston that they would acquire the
following day. When the couple acquired the home in Houston for
$180,000, the vendor reserved a lien and then assigned it to the bank. The
couple did not move to the home in Houston until over a month later. The
couple afterwards filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and asserted that
only $180,000 of their note to the bank was secured by the Houston home as
purchase-money. They argued that the rest of the note could not be so
secured by the Houston home, because it was their homestead at the time
that they purported to give the home as security for the entire note. The
bankrupt couple also asserted that the Houston property was acquired with
the sole intent of making it their homestead and that their Midland home
thereupon lost its homestead character. As the court pointed out, however,
intention alone could not divest the existing home of its exempt character,
and hence the new property could not acquire a homestead designation by
intention alone. 19 7 Although the couple put particular reliance on a decision
in which acquirers of a home were said to have had constructivepossession of
it from the date of purchase for homestead purposes, 198 the court emphasized that the authority relied on dealt with a couple who had no previous
homestead; the decision was therefore inapplicable to the situation before the
court. 199 The burden of showing that the Houston property had become
191. TEX.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
note 57,
197.
198.
El Paso
199.

INS. CODE ANN.

art. 21.23 (Vernon 1981).

726 S.W.2d at 12 (Kilgarlin, J., joined by Campbell, J., concurring and dissenting).
529 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1975).
Crawford, 726 S.W.2d at 13.
61 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
761 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1985), discussed in McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey, supra
at 18-20.
61 Bankr. at 228, 229.
Vaughan v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 124 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. Civ. App.1938, writ ref'd).
Hunt, 61 Bankr. at 228.
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their homestead as of the date of the mortgage was upon the claimants, and
they therefore had to show abandonment of their Midland home prior to
that time. 2°° Hence the claimants were unsuccessful in limiting their collat20 1
eral on the $400,000 note.
2
0
2
In a recent opinion the Texas Attorney General considered whether the
stock in a nonprofit corporation for cooperative housing is afforded homestead protection. The opinion concludes that neither the stock, which belongs to the resident, nor the living space, which belongs to the corporation,
is protected from seizure for debt, 20 3 and the person who occupies the coop2 °4
erative apartment is not entitled to a residential homestead tax exemption.
The resident owns only personalty beyond the scope of the homestead law,
while the corporation is unable to claim a homestead exemption for any purpose. 205 The opinion points out, however, that these conclusions are not
applicable to the owners of condominiums. 20 6 The condominium owner actually owns the residential space and shares common ownership of the other
20 7
elements of the premises.
In In re Yamin 20 8 the debtor occupied a home under a lease from a
wholly owned corporation. As president of the corporation the debtor negotiated a loan from a bank and gave a mortgage on the property with the
assurance that it was not his homestead. After the debtor was adjudicated a
bankrupt, he asserted that the property was his homestead. To sustain his
position he offered into evidence an apparently unrecorded lease agreement
between himself and the corporation by which agreement he was given an
option to purchase the property. The debtor and the corporation were alleged to have entered into the agreement prior to negotiation of the loan with
the bank. Apparently the bankruptcy court did not believe the debtor's evidence with respect to the prior execution of the lease with an option to
purchase and held that the debtor was estopped from asserting any equitable
right in the property because of his misrepresentation as to the homestead
character of the property. 20 9 Even if the unrecorded instrument had been in
existence, but unknown to the bank, the homestead claim should not have
prevailed against a bona fide mortgagee of the record-title-holder, regardless
of misrepresentation. Although a leasehold interest is sufficient to protect
improvements thereon from seizure by the lessee's creditors when the premises are occupied as a homestead, 2 10 neither a corporation nor a partnership
can maintain a homestead claim, nor as a general rule can an individual
200. Id. at 229.
201. Id.
202. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-612 (1986).
203. Id. at 2752-54.
204. Id. at 2747-52, 2754.

205.
206.
207.
Owens,

Id. at 2753.
Id. at 2751.
Id.; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.002(3), 81.104 (Vernon 1984); see Dutcher v.
647 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. 1983).

208. 65 Bankr. 938 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).

209. Id. at 942-43.
210. O'Neil v. Quilter, 111 Tex. 345, 349, 234 S.W. 528, 529 (1921); Capitol Aggregates,
Inc. v. Walker, 448 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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assert a homestead on corporate or partnership property against creditors of
the corporation or partnership. 211 If an individual should maintain a home
on property subject to an option to purchase and the seller's purchaser takes
title subject to the option, it would seem that the option-holder's homestead
claim should prevail. If he has no other home, his misrepresentation to the
seller's creditor as to his nonhomestead claim should not estop him from
2 12

asserting his homestead right.
Tacitly rejecting the argument that ill-gotten gains invested in a homestead have the character of exempt property, 21 3 the court in In re Lodek 21 4
expressly rejected the assertion that the claimant of misapplied funds who
successfully asserts a constructive trust and abstracts his judgment against
the debtor does not hold a right based on a "judicial lien," which would be
subject to avoidance under section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 15
The provision of the bankruptcy law contemplates an incumbrance initially
fixed on property by a judicial proceeding, whereas the claimant's right asserted in Lodek was a subsisting property interest existing prior to
2 16
judgment.
Homestead. Establishingand Enforcing Liens. When homestead protection
was extended generally to single persons in 1973,217 the benefits and limitations for single claimants thereby became identical to those available to married couples, except that the legislature limited to one hundred acres the
211. Although the court found in Yamin that in acquiring the property the debtor had
taken title in the name of the corporation in order to defraud his existing and future creditors,
65 Bankr. at 941, the court nevertheless treated the property as being owned by the corporation and not by the debtor. Id. at 942. In such a situation the title-holder's creditors will
prevail over the creditors of the purchaser. Biccochi v. Casey-Swasey Co., 91 Tex. 259, 272, 42
S.W. 963, 969 (1897). In In re Brokmeyer, 51 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985), it was also
asserted that an individual might maintain a homestead on corporate property and thus preclude the corporation from mortgaging the property. Id. at 705. The claimants there, however, had actually abandoned the property prior to its incumbrance; so no homestead issue was
actually posed.
212. The court stated in Yamin: "Assuming that [the debtor] had established a homestead
interest in and to the property, he abandoned it when he executed the deed of trust and security agreement .... which specifically stated that [the property] was not his homestead." 65
Bankr. at 942. This is a merely rhetorical assumption. In the absence of a subsisting option to
purchase that would be valid against a subsequent corporate creditor, it cannot be assumed
that the debtor established a homestead on the property of the corporation. It is therefore
meaningless to talk of an abandonment by estoppel of something that the claimnat did not
have.
213. See In re Hunter, No. BK-4-350, slip. op. at 14 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 1967),
discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44,
58-59 (1969); Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover, 701 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Tex. App.Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Akin, J., dissenting) (embezzled funds); Baucum v. Texam Oil
Corp. 423 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (fraudulently
obtained funds); First State Bank v. Zelesky, 262 S.W. 190, 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1924, no writ) (embezzled funds); Smith v. Green, 243 S.W. 1006, 1008 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1922, writ ref'd) (wrongful use of partnership funds).
214. 61 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986).
215. Id. at 67-68; 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1979 & Pam. Supp. 1986).
216. 61 Bankr. at 67-68.
217. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; see McKnight, 1982 Annual Survey, supra note 131, at
124.
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amount of rural land a single person might hold as exempt. 21 8 The point of
equality of treatment is apparent from Moray Corp. v. Griggs2 19 in which the

court held that a lien for homestead improvement must be perfected in the
same way against a single owner as against one who is married. 220 The independent constitutional provision 221 for mechanics' and materialmens'
liens is therefore subject to the provision for homestead protection just as it
is in the case of family-homestead claimants.
Although a lien may not be judicially fixed on homestead property for
purposes unrelated to pruchase money, taxes, or improvements for the property itself, 222 in two recent divorce cases the appellate courts have indicated
that a property owner must assert the property's continuing homestead character to a divorce court in order to preclude the fixing of a lien for other
purposes. 223 In Smith v. Smith 224 the Texarkana court of appeals read the
Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley 225 as establishing that if a divorced spouse continued to maintain a home on a property
that was established as the pre-divorce homestead, the homestead character
is not presumed to continue. 226 It must be remembered, however, that after
the Burk Royalty case was decided, the Texas Constitution was amended to
allow a single person without a family to maintain a homestead, 227 and as a
general rule a homestead once established continues until a contestant can
show that it was abandoned. By way of a dictum in Burk Royalty, the court
said that a homestead right does not survive a divorce of a childless marriage. 228 Such a rule is now hard to defend after the constitutional grant of a
homestead to single persons, especially in the light of the court's further
observation in Burk Royalty 229 that the homestead is maintained for members of a family who remain in a home after the parents have divorced. Thus
to say, as the court does in Smith, that no presumption of a continuing
homestead exists following divorce is to stretch the dubious dictum in Burk
Royalty far out of context. The court also overlooked such earlier Texas
2 31
30
Supreme Court cases as Speer & Goodnight v. Sykes 2 and Hall v. Fields
in which the court clearly held that a parent of minor children, though out
218. Now TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(a)(1) (Vernon 1984).
219. 713 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd).
220. Id. at 754-55.
221. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37.
222. Id. § 50; see Wren v. Wren, 702 S.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The rule is the same for contractual liens. See In re Howard, 65
Bankr. 498, 508-09 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986).
223. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 722 S.W.2d 533, 538 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ);
Smith v. Smith, 715 S.W.2d 154, 159-60 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ). In the latter
case the lien fixed on the property was for improvements to that property; therefore, the
court's observations are of little precedential value.
224. 715 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
225. 475 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1972).
226. Smith, 715 S.W.2d at 159.
227. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
228. 475 S.W.2d at 568.
229. Id.
230. 102 Tex. 451, 454, 119 S.W. 86, 87-88 (1909).
231. 81 Tex. 553, 558, 17 S.W. 82, 84 (1891).
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of possession, did not lose his homestead right. 232
In In re Miller 233 the bankruptcy court dealt with the validity of a lien on
an ex-wife's homestead. In their divorce the court awarded the community
home to the wife and gave the husband a lien on it to the extent of his
property interest. In order to purchase her former husband's interest, the
ex-wife borrowed a sum of money from a bank and gave the bank a lien for
the amount borrowed. Thus, the bank was subrogated to the ex-husband's
vendor's purchase-money lien. 234 Because the ex-husband's equitable lien
was by its nature a vendor's lien, the court said that it was immaterial that
the ex-husband had not recorded it.235 Hence, by advancing money to the
ex-wife to buy the former husband's interest, the bank acquired an enforceable lien to the extent of the ex-husband's interest in the homestead
236
property.
Because of the operation of the supremacy doctrine, 237 state exemption
laws are not effective to protect property as exempt if federal law provides
otherwise. 238 But Congress can give state exemption laws effect and has
done so in the federal Bankruptcy Code. 2 3 9 In In re Bubert240 the Small
Business Administration (SBA) asserted that its regulations 24 1 counteracted
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Hence, the SBA argued, a bankrupt
couple who had given SBA a lien on their rural farm of 198 acres could not
assert that the farm was their homestead and thus exempt from seizure. The
bankruptcy court held that although Congress could enact a law making
state exemptions ineffective as to SBA loans, the SBA Regulations could not
242
supersede the Bankruptcy Code.
232. In Smith the court rightly passed over the argument that a lien for reimbursement
cannot be put on benefitted homestead property because the spouses did not contract for it in
writing as prescribed in TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. That provision applies to claims of third
persons and not as between the spouses.
233. 58 Bankr. 192 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
234. Id. at 199.
235. Id. at 197-98 (citing In re Daves, 770 F.2d 1363, 1370 (5th Cir. 1985)).
236. Id. at 200.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 4, cl. 2.
Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097, 1100 (5th Cir. 1972).
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West 1979 & Pam. Supp. 1986).
61 Bankr. 362 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
Any person, corporation, or organization that applies for and receives any
benefit or assistance from SBA, or that offers any assurance of security upon
which SBA relies for the granting of such benefit or assistance, shall not be
entitled to claim or assert any local immunity to defeat the obligation such party
incurred in obtaining or assuring such Federal benefit or assistance.
13 C.F.R. § 101.1(d)(4) (1986).
242. 61 Bankr. at 363. The regulation relied on had been promulgated in response to
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that Texas law
of coverture then prevailing precluded a married woman from entering into a valid contract
with the SBA, and thus the SBA was barred from proceeding against her property to enforce
the contract. Id. at 358. "As a response to the Yazell decision, the limited impact of 13 C.F.R.
§ 101. 1(d) is that state law will be disregarded [with respect to capacity to contract as provided
by state law]. It goes no further .... [I]t does not purport to fill the vacuum thus created by a
positive federal rule of decision." Bubert, 61 Bankr. at 365 (emphasis in original). The Yazell
case is commented on in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21
Sw. L.J. 39, 46 (1967).
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
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Homestead Abandonment. In Ford v. Long 2 4 3 the Tyler court of appeals
held that a man who willfully kills his wife forfeits his right to preclude
partition of the former community property as well as losing his right of use
to his wife's share of the household furnishings. 244 The court relied principally on Bounds v. Caudle,245 in which the Texas Supreme Court imposed246a
constructive trust on property a murderer took under his victim's will.
Support for the court's conclusion is also found in Earle's Executors v.
Earle,247 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that a woman who abandoned her husband was precluded from claiming a homestead in his property after his death. 24 8 If abandonment of a spouse can have the effect of
losing homestead rights, murder of the spouse should surely have the same
effect.
Exempt Personalty. In Sloan v. Douglass249 an assignee of an employee's
judgment creditor sought turnover of his current wages in excess of $30,000
in 1983 under what is now section 31.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. 250 Under the contract of employment between the employer and the
employee a part of the employee's annual salary earned during the years
1983-1985 was deferred and would be paid in monthly installments for ten
years beginning in 1986. The court held that the deferred wages were therefore not even current wages. 251 As the funds should become due between
1986 and 1996, they would be current wages and would be exempt and protected from seizure under the turnover statute. 252 The Fort Worth court of
appeals further noted that because current wages are absolutely protected
the $30,000
from garnishment regardless of amount, their inclusion within
2 53
exemption ceiling in section 42.002(8) is unconstitutional.
In applying Texas law to a determination of whether particular property
could be claimed as exempt, the bankruptcy court of the Northern District
of Texas concluded in In re Cypert 254 that a fishing boat 255 was not exempt.
The court was emphatic. "There is no showing that the boat is reasonably
necessary for the family of the debtor, and it is highly unlikely that any such
showing could be made."' 256 Although the determination was easily reached
in this instance by applying the "reasonably necessary" standard for "athletic and sporting equipment, '257 it has been suggested that a "regularly
243. 713 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

244. Id. at 799.
245.

560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 929.

9 Tex. 630 (1853).
Id. at 633-34.
713 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
250. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1986).
251. 713 S.W.2d at 440.
252. Id. at 440-41.
253. Id. at 442; see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66,
85-86 (1974).
254. 68 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
255. A 1975 Glasspar boat.
256. 68 Bankr. at 452.
257. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(3)(E) (Vernon 1984).
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used" test might be more easily applied, and some have advocated that personalty within the protected types and within the value of $30,000 should be
claimable regardless of need or regularity of use.
In In re Allen 258 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that under
the provisions of what is now Property Code section 42.001259 a Texas
debtor who has chosen to assert state personal property exemptions in bankruptcy cannot avail himself of the benefits of section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code 26° to invalidate contractual liens on that property. 261 Having
concluded that the federal circuit court wrongly construed Texas law in its
interpretation of section 522(f), Judge Ayres of the Western District of
Texas declined to follow the interpretation of the higher court in two chapter
13 proceedings considered together in In re Thompson.262 The court not
only deemed the decision ill-considered when rendered, but concluded that
the circuit court would decide the case differently if now called upon to do so
in the light of opinions in other circuits, the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, and regulations of the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Reserve Board. 2 63 No appeal was taken to Judge Ayres's decision, and
the bankruptcy court of the Northern District followed Thompson in In re
Rodgers,264 but the district judge reversed the lower court's judgment on
appeal. 265 A bankruptcy court in the Southern District of Texas later followed the Allen case without any discussion of contrary views. 266 Rather
than leaving debtors to do further battle in the courts on this issue, the Family Law Section of the State Bar favors an amendment to state law by which
Texas debtors in bankruptcy will be able to claim the benefits of section
522(f).

IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Property Settlement Agreements. In 1967 the Supreme Court of Texas held
that the long-standing rule 267 for the enforcement of a property settlement
agreement between spouses in anticipation of divorce included a contract for
payment of periodic support after divorce. 268 If the terms of the contract are
incorporated in the decree by quotation or by reference, or if the decree itself
constitutes the agreement of the parties, they are not only bound contractu258. 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984), noted in McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 22,
at 157.
259. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1984). Although the provision of which
§ 42.001(c) purports to be a nonsubstantive restatement did not necessarily support the construction given it in Allen, that section as it now stands clearly does so.
260. 11 U.S.C.A § 522(f) (West 1979 & Pam. Supp. 1986).
261. 725 F.2d at 292-93.
262. 59 Bankr. 690 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986).
263. Id. at 692-96. The applicable Federal Trade Commission regulation is 16 C.F.R.
§ 442.2(a)(2) (1986). That of the Federal Reserve Board is 12 C.F.R. § 227.13(b) (1986).
264. 63 Bankr. 686, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
265. In re Rodgers, 68 Bankr. 17, 18 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
266. In re Graham, 64 Bankr. 469, 472-73 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
267. Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390, 394-95, 13 S.W. 324, 325-26 (1890).
268. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967).
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ally, 269 but in the last instance they are also ordered to perform by the terms
of the decree. During the last two decades nice questions have arisen with
respect to such agreements: What defenses may be raised to their enforcement; what modes of enforcement are available; and is the meaning of the
instrument to be determined under the law of contracts or the law of judgments? 270 Although the old law concerning the enforceability of property
settlements did not require that the agreement be in writing, 271 a number of
recent statutes tend to produce that effect. The 1948 constitutional amend272
ment on partitions of community property and its statutory counterpart
required a writing, as did the reenactments of that principle in 1967, 1969,
1973, and 1981.273 To facilitate the process of amicable settlement on divorce the legislature in 1981 provided that divorcing spouses may enter into
written agreements with respect to property liability and future maintenance, and the court can alter the terms of agreement only if it finds that the
agreement is not just and right. 274 Rule 11275 on written agreements of parties to litigation also plays a part in the almost pervasive requirement of
writing for agreements relating to division of property on divorce.
Lohse v. Cheatham 276 dealt with a suit for enforcement of a divorce decree
that the trial court mistook for an agreed judgment. The appellate court
noted that since the parties had not agreed to the decree, contract law could
not be used in construing it.277 The court of appeals therefore held that the
trial court was incorrect in interpreting the divorce decree as an agreed judg269. Buck v. Rogers, 709 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ). If

the contract is for the benefit of a third person, he may enforce the contract made for his
benefit. See Alexander v. Alexander, 701 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
270. These matters are commented on in McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 57, at
28-31; McKnight, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 26-27; McKnight, 1983 Annual Survey, supra note 119, at 90-92.
271. Callicoatte v. Callicoatte, 417 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
272. 1948 amend. to TEX CONST. art. XVI, § 15, and 1949 enactment of § 4624a.
273. Act of May 27, 1967, arts. 4610, 4624a, ch. 309, § 1, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 735, 73839; Act of May 14, 1969, § 5.41, ch. 888, § 1, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 2729; Act of June 15, 1973,
§ 5.42(a), ch. 577, § 32, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1608; Act of June 17, 1981, § 5.44, ch. 782, § 2
1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2965.
274. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1987); see Wheeler v. Wheeler, 713
S.W.2d 148, 150 ('rex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.); McEntire v. McEntire, 706
S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Oldham, PremaritalCon21 Hous. L. REV. 757, 766-68 (1984).
tracts Are Now Enforceable Unless ....
275. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 states: "No agreement between attorneys or parties
touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the
papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record." In
Dehnert v. Dehnert, 705 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ), the Beaumont
court of appeals dealt with a settlement agrreement that, though unsigned by the husband,
despite the requirement of rule 11, was returned by the husband's attorney to the wife's attorney with a written indication of agreement. The court held that because the husband had
authorized his attorney to act on his behalf, the agreement complied with the requirements of
rule 11. Id. at 851. As further support for its ruling the court noted that the husband had
taken advantage of the agreement by receiving some of the property under it, and therefore he
should not be allowed to attack the agreement. Id. See infra notes 394-95.
276. 705 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd).
277. Id. at 726.
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ment and should have interpreted its literal language278
without looking to the
testimony of the parties at the enforcement hearing.
In Mackey v. Mackey 279 the only written evidence of the parties' agreed
judgment was the decree itself, in which the husband was ordered to pay the
wife a monthly sum for support. The fact that the parties had not entered
into an independent agreement in writing did not preclude subsequent reliance on the agreement as a contract. 280 If the subject matter of the contract
in issue must be in writing to be enforceable, however, the failure to plead
the lack of writing will constitute waiver of that requirement. 28

In

Kartchnerv. Kartchner282 the court held that what purported to be a partition agreement, which was not in writing and was not incorporated in the
decree, could not be enforced because it was properly objected to as not
being in writing. 28 3 If the parole agreement had been assented to by the
parties and entered as an agreed judgment, however, it would have been
enforceable as such.
In Conn v. Trow 28 4 the Texarkana court interpreted the terms of a divorce
decree after the death of the former husband. It was stipulated at trial that
the decree had reflected the couple's property settlement agreement.
Although, pursuant to the agreement, the decree divested the wife of all interest in the husband's retirement plan, he failed to change the designation of
his ex-wife as beneficiary of death benefits under the plan. In affirming the
trial court's ruling against the ex-wife, who brought suit for the death benefits, the Texarkana court stated that the property settlement agreement that
was incorporated in the decree was a contract "to be interpreted as a contract.

'285

The clear language of agreement, as expressed in the decree,

clearly precluded the ex-wife's claim under the retirement plan. The court
also noted that in this instance the death benefits payable on the employee's
28 6
death were not meant as insurance but as property of the employee.
In Allen v. Allen 287 the Texas Supreme Court carried the doctrine of applying contractual rules to an agreed judgment to new heights. The court
stated that although a property settlement agreement is incorporated in a
divorce decree, "its legal force and meaning are governed by the law of con278. Id. A similar dispute was before the court in Fox v. Fox, 720 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ), and was handled similarly. Id. at 882.
279. 721 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
280. Id. at 578-79.
281. Praeger v. Wilson, 721 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); cf.
Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 422 (May 6, 1987) (agreed order to support a nondisabled
adult child was not enforceable as a contract because agreement did not specifically provide for
contractual enforcement as required by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(d) (Vernon 1986)).
282. 721 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
283. The agreement was entered into prior to the enactment of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 3.631 in 1981, and the court therefore construed the agreement under what is now TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.44 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
284. 715 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
285. Id. at 153; see Binkley v. Wade, 703 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. App.-Waco, 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (dictum).
286. 715 S.W.2d at 153.
287. 717 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1986).
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tracts, not the law of judgments. ' '2 88 In giving full effect to this doctrine, the
court went on to hold that a settlement agreement might be reformed to
correct a mutual mistake of the parties in omitting particular property from
its terms. 289 At the time the couple entered into their settlement agreement,
the husband was operating a community corporation located on land to
which both spouses held title. By the settlement agreement the husband was
awarded the corporation, but no provision was made for conveyance of the
land. After the divorce the ex-husband brought suit for enforcement or clarification of the decree. There was evidence that each spouse entered into the
property settlement mistakenly believing that the realty had already been
conveyed to the corporation. The Supreme Court of Texas therefore concluded that the trial court might reform the decree in accordance with con290
tractual principles and thus to correct the mutual mistake of the parties.
In Giddings v. Giddings29 1 the Austin court of appeals considered whether
a party to a divorce can maintain a suit for breach of a settlement agreement
incorporated in a divorce decree if it is subsequently asserted that compliance was waived. The agreement in issue vested the family residence in the
wife, but allowed the husband to occupy the house temporarily in order to
make repairs. The ex-husband fell behind in the repairs, and when he told
his former wife of his intentions to employ someone else to do the work, she
told him that she had already sold the house. Thereafter he made no further
repairs, and the ex-wife sued him for his failure to comply with the agreement. At trial the ex-husband attempted to show that his former wife had
waived her right of enforcement by stating that she had sold the house. The
ex-wife sought to exclude the evidence concerning sale on the ground that its
introduction would constitute a collateral attack on the decree. Sustaining
the ex-wife's position, the trial court held that once a settlement agreement is
approved, the agreement merges into the judgment of the court. 29 2 Hence,
raising a contractual defense to the decree would constitute a collateral attack on the judgment. 293 The Austin court first distinguished attacks on the
initial validity of the underlying agreement from attacks based on subsequent events. 294 The court said that a party to an agreed judgment has been

uniformly prohibited from asserting defenses that operate as an attack on the
agreement at its inception. 29 5 The court noted a split of authority, however,
as to defenses based on events subsequent to the execution of the agree288. Id. at 313.
289. The case was tried prior to the effective date of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.70-.77
(Vernon Supp. 1987).
290. 717 S.W.2d at 313; cf McEntire v. McEntire, 706 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The implication of the court's language in McEntire, id. at
350, is that an agreed judgment is impervious to judicial alteration under TEX. R. Civ. P.
329b, whereas a court's approval of an agreement pursuant to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631
(Vernon Supp. 1987) would presumably be subject to judicial alteration under that rule.
291. 701 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
292. Id. at 287.
293. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1979).
294. Giddings, 701 S.W.2d at 287-88.
295. The court stated that a party cannot raise a defense that attacks "the validity of the
agreement at inception, execution, or at the time it is approved by the court in the divorce
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ment. 296 The court concluded that a party can raise contractual defenses
only if they relate to events that occur subsequent to the execution of the
agreement and only to the extent that the defenses are not contrary to the
final judgment. 297 The Austin court's analysis does not conform to that of
the Fort Worth appeals court in Towne v. Towne 298 with respect to the initial validity of an agreed judgment, 299 and in Herbert v. Herbert3 00 the Fort
Worth court also reached a contrary conclusion in considering an alleged
breach of an agreed settlement.
In Herbert the ex-wife asserted breach of the settlement agreement, and
her former husband defended on the ground that she had already materially
breached the agreement, thereby relieving him of his duty to perform under
general contractual principles. The trial court found for the ex-husband.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did not substantiate
the jury's finding, 30 1 but added that, on remand, the ex-husband could not
assert material breach of the property settlement agreement on the part of
the ex-wife as an affirmative defense. 30 2 Such an assertion would be "an
impermissible collateral attack on the finality of the property settlement
agreement/judgment. ' 30 3 This conclusion 3°4seems at variance with the
supreme court's approach in Allen v. Allen.
In Miller v. Miller 30 5 the Texas Supreme Court dealt with a consent decree signed by both parties about eight months before being entered by the
court. The decree provided that the husband would be entitled to a fixed
sum on the sale of the family home. In resisting her former husband's suit
for the agreed amount, the ex-wife asserted that the couple had altered their
agreement prior to the entry of the decree. Despite the fact that the trial
court awarded the ex-husband less than the decree awarded, the trial judge
did not find that the parties had reached a new agreement. Although the
court said that the law of contracts governs the interpretation of the decree
based on a property settlement agreement, 30 6 there was no agreement but
the one evidenced by the consent decree. The court therefore rendered judgdecree." Id. at 287 (emphasis in original). These defenses include lack of consideration, duress, and lack of capacity. Id.
296. See Sorrels v. Sorrels, 592 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (permitting defense); Akin v. Akin, 417 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1967, no writ) (prohibiting defense).
297. Giddings, 701 S.W.2d at 289.
298. 707 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
299. Id. at 748-49.
300. 699 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ granted).
301. Id. at 724; see McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 56, at 30.
302. Herbert, 699 S.W.2d at 727.
303. Id.
304. 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986); see supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
305. 721 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1987). The supreme court took jurisdiction of the case as a
dispute concerning an agreement incorporated in a divorce decree. Id. at 843; see Cornell v.
Cornell, 413 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. 1967). The court would have been precluded from taking
jurisdiction under TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(b)(3) (Vernon Pam. 1987). 721 S.W.2d
at 843.
306. 721 S.W.2d at 844; see Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986).
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ment for the ex-husband for the fixed amount provided in the decree. 30 7
Carreon v. Morales308 concerned the meaning of terms of a settlement
agreement that community property not specifically divided was the property of the party who managed the property. Stating that each provision of
an agreement should be given some meaning and effect, the El Paso court of
appeals held that the residuary clause of the settlement had the effect of
awarding to the husband his retirement benefits and a life insurance policy in
30 9
his possession.
In Powers v. Powers3 10 the husband and wife had entered into a property
settlement agreement providing that the husband would pay alimony and
child support, and the wife agreed that she would not claim their children as
dependents for federal income tax purposes and that she would supply her
husband with her federal income tax return at least a month before the filing
deadline. The ex-wife did not comply with these requirements, and the exhusband ceased paying the agreed alimony. In response to the ex-wife's suit
for breach of the contract, the former husband asserted that the obligations
of the ex-spouses were reciprocal. Both the trial and appellate courts refused
to interpret the duties of the ex-wife as a condition precedent to the ex-husband's performance in the absence of a clear agreement to that effect. 3 11
Further, if the ex-husband had sought to show mitigation of damages by the
his federal tax liability, it
amount that the ex-wife's breach had 3 increased
12
was his burden to prove that amount.
In an action to enforce terms of a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree the Fourteenth District court of appeals held in
Pettitt v. Pettitt 313 that the ten-year statute for enforcement of judgments is
the applicable statute of limitation. 3 14 Because the property dealt with in the
agreement was the husband's separate property, the court rejected the applicability of the two-year provision of section 3.70315 as a relevant only to
division of community property under section 3.63316 and not to divisions
under section 3.631.317 The court also rejected the four-year statute318 as
applying only to contracts and not to judgments. 3 19 The court's process of
selection of the proper limitation statute is exceptionally contrived and illustrates a need for statutory overhaul of the entire scheme of the time allowed
for enforcement of family law decrees.
The availability of state contractual rules for the interpretation of property
307. 721 S.W.2d at 844.
308. 698 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
309. Id. at 245.
310. 714 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
311. Id. at 388.
312. Id. at 389.
313. 704 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
314. Id. at 923-24 (applying TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 31.006, 34.001
(Vernon 1986)).
315. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(c) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
316. Id. § 3.63.
317. Id. § 3.631; 704 S.W.2d at 923.
318. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
319. 704 S.W.2d at 923.
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settlement agreements does not necessarily make state enforcement mechanisms available to enforce the contract when federal interests are involved.
In Stubbe v. Stubbe 320 the Austin court of appeals declined to allow garnishment of military pay when the ex-husband failed to comply with his contractual obligations and his ex-wife recovered a money judgment against him. 321
Though the property settlement was incorporated in the divorce decree, the
court held that what was to be enforced was not a court order to pay alimony but merely a contract.3 22 It is submitted that this interpretation of
section 3.631323 is unjustifiably narrow if the court actually orders compliance with the agreement. In spite of prior contrary judicial opinion, 324 the
language of the statute clearly allows a court to order the payment of alimony as agreed by the spouses.
Property Not Subject to Division. In Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer 32 5 the Texas
Supreme Court held that separate realty is not divisible on divorce, 326 and in
Cameron v. Cameron 327 the court stated that the same rule is applicable to
separate personalty. 328 That court has also treated nonassignable federal
Veterans' Administration benefits in a like manner. 329 Because a National
Service Life Insurance policy is a Veteran's Administration entitlement, 330
the Tyler court concluded that its cash value is not subject to division on
1
divorce.

33

A most difficult question dealing with property subject to division was
presented to the First District court of appeals in Ismail v. Ismail,332 involving a suit for divorce of two Egyptian citizens. Only the petitioner was domiciled in Texas, though the couple had previously lived in Houston for six
years before returning to Egypt. Thereafter the wife returned to Houston in
1981 and filed for divorce there in January 1982. After a further two
months' trip to Egypt, the wife returned to Houston and remained there
until the trial. Both parties were subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
court. Of the spouses' marital property the trial court awarded the wife all
the Texas real property, funds deposited in Texas banks, and personal property in her possession. The husband received all real and personal property
in Egypt. At trial, and on appeal, the husband asserted that most of the
320. 710 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ granted).
321. Id. at 678.
322. Id. at 675-76.
323. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
324. Klise v. Klise, 678 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ);
see Powers v. Powers, 714 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
325. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
326. Id. at 142.
327. 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex 1982).
328. Id. at 220.
329. Kamel v. Kamel, 721 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ) (relying on
Exparte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 194-96 (Tex. 1981); Exparte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453, 454
(Tex. 1979)).
330. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-726 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986); Id. § 3101 (West 1979).
331. Kamel, 721 S.W.2d at 453. The court might have also relied on Wissner v. Wissner,
338 U.S. 655, 658-59 (1950).
332. 702 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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property was not subject to division because it had been acquired by nonTexas domiciliaries. Thus, the husband argued, section 3.63333 did not authorize the division of the Texas realty because the husband had never been
a Texas domiciliary and the petitioning wife had established her Texas domicile unilaterally. The implication of the husband's argument was the the
Texas realty was properly characterized as his separate property, and that
the Texas statute allowing its division or divestiture was federally unconstitutional as violative of the principle of due process and invalid under the
Texas Constitution as an award of the husband's separate property to his
wife.
The court rejected the federal attack as not demonstrated by any applicable precedential authority or any convincing argument that precludes Texas
from determining whether Texas realty may be awarded to a Texas domiciliary on divorce. 334 Further, from a due process perspective, the interest of
Texas in the division of property located in the state coupled with the husband's contacts with Texas justified the application of the provisions of section 3.63(b). 335 As to the husband's attack on the division under the Texas
Constitution, the solution was easy: The Texas realty in this case did not
meet the Texas constitutional definition of separate property that would
therefore be precluded from divestiture.3 36 If, however, the divorce court
lacks personal jurisdiction over a spouse, the court may be unable to adjudicate the spouse's interest in personal property either on general jurisdictional

principles 337 or on the basis of particular federal law that governs the per338
sonal property at issue.
When a mischaracterization of property results in an improper division of
property, as it almost certainly will, 339 the reviewing court must remand the
case for reconsideration. 340 But unappealed instances of mischaracterization
333. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
334. 702 S.W.2d at 219-20. The court rejected the analysis of a California court to the
contrary, see In re Marriage of Roesch, 83 Cal. App. 3d 96, 147 Cal. Rptr. 586, 592-93 (1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979), as based on the minimal interest of California in the marital
property there in issue as compared to the substantial interest of Pennsylvania from whence
the wife alone had moved. Ismail, 702 S.W.2d at 219-20. The court also rejected as baseless
the husband's argument that the Texas statute was inapplicable because its purpose was to deal
with spousal moves from common law states, and Egypt employs neither a common law nor a
community property handling of marital property. Id. at 219.
335. 702 S.W.2d at 219-20.
336. Id. at 220.
337. See McKnight, Family Law: Husbandand Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw.
L.J. 115, 139 (1980).
338. See Barrett v. Barrett, 715 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ);
Dunn v. Dunn, 708 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App---Dallas 1986, no writ); Kovacich v. Kovacich,
705 S.W.2d 281, 282-83 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.). All were unsuccessful post-divorce cases for partition of retirement benefits overlooked by the divorce court.
339. See McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 22, at 162; see also Whorrall v. Whorrail, 691 S.W.2d 32, 36-37 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (divesting spouse of
his .9% separate interest held harmful error), discussed in McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey,
supra note 57, at 35.
340. Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 699 S.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ
dism'd). In Conroy v. Conroy, 706 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ), the trial
court awarded the husband Veterans' Administration disability pay (separate property) and
ordinary military retirement pay (community property) and referred to both as separate prop-

1987]

FAMIL Y LA W: HUSBAND AND WIFE

cannot be attacked as void, 34 1 even those involving division of federal benefits, mischaracterized in the light of a later federal statute. 342
Retirement Benefits. Over the last decade the problem of division of federal
retirement benefits has produced a bewildering variety of responses from the
Texas appellate courts. In spite of the demonstrated hostility of the United
States Supreme Court to the principles of community property law, 343 one

wonders whether the Court would have interpreted the Railroad Retirement
Act 344 as it did in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo345 in 1979, if it had realized the
sort of response its opinion would produce. Having dealt with that congressional act as it did, however, the Court could scarcely interpret the military
retirement law differently when that issue came before it in McCarty v. McCarty346 two years later. Even in hindsight, one might not have predicted

that Congress would react quite as it did in enacting the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act 347 (USFSPA) less than fifteen months later.
The reaction of the Texas courts to these developments has been strikingly
inconsistent. From the first, the Texas Supreme Court's analysis of the problem has vacillated between the application of a variety of approaches, and
the lower appellate courts' decisions have shown a remarkable volatility in
dealing with (1) divisions of property and federal retirement benefits prior to
McCarty but appealed thereafter, (2) divisions after McCarty but before the
enactment of the USFSPA, (3) divisions of property both before and after
McCarty that failed to deal with federal retirement benefits, and (4) cases
brought after the enactment of the USFSPA that seek to change prior divisions of federal retirement benefits consistent with the purported intent of
Congress to wipe away the precedential effect of McCarty. In Cameron v.
Cameron 348 the Texas Supreme Court initially emphasized one of the principal provisions of the USFSPA: that the change made by the act only affects
erty. The appellate court regarded the error as harmless. Id. at 748. It is not clear, however,
whether the appellate court compounded a genuine error of the trial court with respect to the
ordinary military retirement pay or merely put straight an inadvertent error of description on

the part of the trial court.
341. Jewell v. Jewell, 723 S.W.2d 340, 242 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ); Putegnat
v. Putegnat, 706 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
Although the vexing problem of dealing with a spouse's professional degree acquired at
community expense, see Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1980, writ dism'd), has not lately arisen in any Texas appellate case, a helpful discussion of the matter is found in Note, Family Law: ProfessionalDegrees in 1986-Family Sacrifice Equals Family Asset, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 276, 301-03 (1986).
342. Allison v. Allison, 700 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); see also Anderson v.
Anderson, 707 S.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
343. See Reppy, Community Property in the U.S. Supreme Court-Why Such a Hostile
Reception?, 10 COMM. PROP. J. 93, 118-19 (1983).
344. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231u (1982).
345. 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979).
346. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
347. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982) (effective Feb. 1, 1983).
348. 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982), discussed in McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note
22, at 164-65. The interpretation of the decree in that matter was before an appellate court in
Cook v. Cameron, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 293, 295 (Mar. 18, 1987).
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pay-periods of recipients of benefits commencing after June 25, 1981. 349 Recently in Kamel v. Kamel 350 the Tyler court of appeals made the same point
concerning the act of August 12, 1983, which allowed application of state
law to divisions of that portion of Railroad Retirement Act annuities accruing after September 1, 1983. 3 51 In both instances, however, the number of
months of marriage used to determine the amount of community-sharing in
the benefit is not affected by the dates referred to in either act. In Kamel the
court went on to indicate that the nonpensioner must therefore show352
how
much of the federal annuity is subject to division under the 1983 act.
A number of disputes have arisen with respect to adjudications of pension
rights made during the period between the decision in McCarty (June 26,
1981) and the effective date of the USFSPA (February 1, 1983). 353 In the
case of a property division made immediately after McCarty, and in accordance with McCarty, but heard on appeal after the enactment of the USFSPA, the appellant is entitled to a new trial on all issues of property division
on remand. 354 Although the USFSPA indicates a congressional intent that
the act apply to all funds payable after June 25, 1981, 3 55 the Texas Supreme
Court concluded in Allison v. Allison 35 6 that an order expressly awarding
retirement benefits during the defined period and not appealed must not be
later disturbed. 357 In Wright v. Wright 358 the San Antonio court of appeals
reached the same conclusion, adding that the case at hand had involved an
agreed judgment that specifically bound the parties. 359 On the other hand,
in cases involving divorce decrees rendered after McCarty, but prior to the
effective date of the USFSPA, the courts have partitioned the undivided
community benefits that became a tenancy in common. The decision of the
Austin court of appeals in Eddy v. Eddy 360 is a recent instance; the principle
of res judicata did not apply because there was no adjudication with respect
36 1
to the retirement benefits.
The situation before the Waco court of appeals in Powell v. Powell 362 was
somewhat more complicated. Powell was a case of a pre-McCarty divorce in
which the divorce court did not divide the benefits. Further, also prior to
the McCarty decision, the ex-wife had brought suit for partition of the bene349. 641 S.W.2d at 213; see 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982).

350. 721 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ).
351. Id. at 453 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 231m(b)(2) (West Supp. 1986)).
352. 721 S.W.2d at 452-53.
353. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, tit. X,
§ 1006(a), 96 Stat. 730, 737 (1982).
354. Gordon v. Gordon, 704 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
For previous appeal see Gordon v. Gordon, 659 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983,
no writ).
355. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982).
356. 700 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).
357. Id. at 915.
358. 710 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
359. Id. at 166.
360. 710 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
361. Id. at 785.
362. 703 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1489, 89 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1986).
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fits, and the trial court had granted her petition. On the ex-husband's appeal
following McCarty, the trial court's disposition was reversed. After the
USFSPA became effective, the ex-wife again sought a partition. On appeal
the Waco court held that the doctrine of res judicata did not preclude subsequent proceedings because the grounds for relief were not and could not
have been litigated in the prior suit. 363 The result, though salutary, seems to
contradict the conclusion of the Texas Supreme Court in Allison. In allowing the judgment in Powell to stand, however, the Texas Supreme Court
evidently did not think so.
If an employee's retirement benefits are increased subsequent to divorce,
either as an adjustment for inflation in the cost of living or otherwise, a
question arises whether the former spouse is entitled to share in the increase.
In Berry v. Berry,364 in which the nonpensioner ex-wife sought a partition of
an undivided pension interest after divorce, the Texas Supreme Court held
that the ex-wife could not share in the increased benefits due to renegotiation
of the employee's contract of employment, and hence the partitionable share
of the benefits was valued at the time of the divorce. 365 As intimated in
Berry, the burden of proof to show the amount of the benefits belonging to
the pensioner is upon the party who is in the better position to have that
knowledge, normally the pensioner. 366 In another post-divorce partition
case 367 the San Antonio court of appeals relied on Berry to exclude the
nonpensioner from sharing in cost-of-living increases in the pensioner's benefits. 368 While suggesting that such a strict interpretation of Berry produces
unfairness to the nonpensioner, the Corpus Christi court of appeals in May v.
May 369 undertook to construct a new formula consistent with Berry for the
purpose of computing the community interest in a pension plan of a spouse
who has not retired or is still employed at the time of the divorce. 370 In
presenting its new method for computing the divisible community share of a
pension interest in such cases, the court pointed out that the Texas Supreme
Court's formula enunciated in Taggart v. Taggart37 1 is only suitable for
363. Id. at 436. The result is the same as might have been achieved by allowing an exspouse the benefit of a new adjudication by bill of review after having been denied an interest in
military retirement benefits as a result of McCarty. See McKnight, 1983 Annual Survey, supra
note 131, at 103 n.319; Note, Closing the McCarty-USFPA Window: A Proposalfor Relief
from McCarty-EraFinal Judgments, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 497, 518-31 (1984). A proposal for
legislation that would have had the same effect did not appeal to the Legislature in 1985. H.B.
1145 did not reach the floor of the House of Representatives.
364. 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983).
365. Id. at 947.
366. Id.; Jackson v. Green, 700 S.W.2d 620, 621-22 (Tex. App.---Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ).
367. Dunn v. Dunn, 703 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(civil-service retirement).
368. Id. at 321.
369. 716 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ). In suggesting unfairness
the court relied on Comment, An InterdisciplinaryAnalysis of the Division of Pension Benefits
in Divorce and Post-Judgment PartitionAction: Curesfor the Inequities in Berry v. Berry, 37
BAYLOR L. REV. 107, 152-64 (1985). May, 716 S.W.2d at 711 n.4.
370. May, 716 S.W.2d at 710-11.
371. 552 S.W.2d 422, 423-24 (Tex. 1977).
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cases involving a spouse who has retired or has 372
terminated employment
under a retirement plan at the time of the divorce.
Grier v. Grier 373 was a suit for the partition of an undivided community
interest in military retirement benefits. At the time the spouses were divorced in 1975, the prospective pensioner had been placed on a promotion
list but was not promoted in rank until eight months after the divorce.
Hence, under Berry, the trial court erred in treating the pensioner as already
promoted to a higher pension level prior to divorce in computing the value
of the community interest in the soldier's retirement plan. 374 The El Paso
court of appeals noted that the USFSPA limits division of the benefits to
"disposable retired pay."' 375 On further review the Texas Supreme Court
made two additional points. 376 First, the amount of the benefits that a Texas
377
court may divide is not limited to fifty percent of disposable retired pay.
That percentage is merely a limit on the amount that may be garnished and
paid by the service secretaries pursuant to a court order.378 Second, as a sort
of postscript, the court added that the nonpensioner's share may include
"increases which may occur other than increases attributable to elevation in
rank or services rendered by the military spouse after the date of the divorce." 379 Thus, the court allowed an award to a nonpensioner to include
cost-of-living or inflation increases in post-divorce benefits.
Making the Division. In making a division of property, the trial court must
hear evidence on the nature and value of all the property about which there
is dispute 38 0 and then divide the property as is "just and right" under the
circumstances. 38 1 The proper manner of questioning the exercise of a
court's discretion in making a property division is by appeal and not by bill
of review.

382

All too often, but with little if any substatiating reason, an appellant will
allege an abuse of discretion of a divorce court in dividing community property. As may be anticipated, the appellate court usually dismisses the plea as
372. May, 716 S.W.2d at 710. In Anderson v. Anderson, 707 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the ex-husband had apparently completed his military
service when the parties were divorced in 1971. The spouses had entered into a property
settlement agreement, incorporated in the divorce decree, which gave the wife one-half of the
husband's retirement benefits. The court construed the agreement as giving the ex-wife onehalf of what the former husband received after he became eligible to receive benefits in 1981.
Id. at 169; see Ulmer v. Ulmer, 717 S.W.2d 665, 668-69 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no
writ).
373. 713 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986).
374. Id. at 215 (citing Rankin v. Bateman, 686 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
375. Id. at 216.
376. Grier v. Grier, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 416, 417-18 (May 6, 1987).
377. Id.
378. Id.; 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (1982).
379. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 418.
380. Haley v. Haley, 713 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, no writ);
Mata v. Mata, 710 S.W.2d 756, 758-60 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
381. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
382. Arndt v. Arndt, 714 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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unfounded. 383 In Morrison v. Morrison,384 for example, the husband appealed the court's award of over eighty percent of the community estate to
the wife. The appellate court nevertheless presumed that the trial court was
thereby "reimbursing" the wife for the husband's substantial diversion of the
community estate in favor of other women and the husband's fault in the
385
breakdown of the marriage by committing adultery.
An abuse of discretion is nevertheless sometimes found. In one instance
the trial court's mistake was attributed to an erroneous determination of
paternity, 386 whereas in others the error was said to rest on an insufficiency
of evidence in the record as to the property and its value. 387 In Haley v.
Haley388 the wife-appellant did not appear at the trial, and the trial court
awarded the husband the bulk of a community estate worth over one million
dollars. Because there was no recorded evidence as to the value of the property, the appellate court remanded the property division for a new trial. 389
In Breeze v. Breeze,390 in which the husband alleged that the unequal division was violative of the Texas Constitution in discriminating against him
because of his sex, 3 9 1 the appellate court put the burden on the appellant to
substantiate his allegation of an affirmatively abusive act. 392 In saying that
the husband lacked standing to contest the prevailing interpretation of section 3.63393 that includes sex of the parties as a standard for making a "just
and right" division, 394 the Fort Worth court of appeals apparently meant
that the husband had not raised the issue at trial and had offered no specific
evidence that supported his position.
In Smith v. Smith 395 the Texarkana court of appeals found error in
achieving division if not in the division itself. The trial court had awarded
the wife a money judgment at interest for reimbursement of her share of
community funds used by the husband to benefit his separate property. The
383. See Rafidi v. Rafidi, 718 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Ulmer v.
Ulmer, 717 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ); Morrison v. Morrison,
713 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Peery v. Peery, 709 S.W.2d

392, 394 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Rutledge v. Rutledge, 709 S.W.2d 389, 392
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Breeze v. Breeze, 707 S.W.2d 298, 300-01
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Conroy v. Conroy, 706 S.W.2d 745, 748
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ); Hernandez v. Hernandez, 703 S.W.2d 250, 254 (TEx.
App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ); Wren v. Wren, 702 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. App.-Hous-

ton [ist Dist.] 1985, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Beaupre v. Beaupre, 700 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Jones v. Jones, 699 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex.

App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ).
384. 713 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.).

385. Id. at 379.
386. W.K. v. M.H.K., 719 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no
writ).
387. Haley v. Haley, 713 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ);
Mata v. Mata, 710 S.W.2d 756, 758-60 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
388. 713 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).

389. Id. at 805.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

707 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 3a.
707 S.W.2d at 301.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
707 S.W.2d at 300-01.
715 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
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trial court also imposed a lien on the husband's separate property for payment of the award and required the husband to execute a deed of trust on all
of his separate property in furtherance of that objective. The appellate court
held that the trial court should not have put a judicial lien on property other
than that which had been benefited through the use of community funds and
that in ordering the husband to execute the deed of trust the trial court had
exceeded its power. 396 In Stapler v. Stapler,397 however, a lien on property
awarded to one spouse was said to be implied by the agreement of the parties
exthat one would pay certain debts of the other, with the result that the
398
spouse who paid the debt as agreed was entitled to foreclose the lien.
Attorney's Fees. In Cunningham v. Cunningham399 the wife brought suit for
divorce against her husband who was a domiciliary of another state. He
appeared specially to contest personal jurisdiction over him, but in making a
division of the community property the trial court nonetheless ordered him
to pay certain debts incurred during the marriage, as well as the wife's attorney's fees. On the husband's appeal the court held that these aspects of the
judgment were void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction to render
such orders. 4°°
In Inman v. O'Donnell4 1 the award of attorney's fees was severed from
the division of property when the trial court purported to enter a final judgment of divorce. Rather than appealing, the husband sought a writ of prohibition from the court of appeals to deter the trial judge from so proceeding.
The appellate court held that the husband had chosen the wrong remedy and
denied his petition. 40 2 While it was clearly improper for the court to sever
the award of attorney's fees from the division of property in general, the
Dallas court of appeals held that the husband's proper course of action was
4°3
to object to severance and, if his objection was overruled, to appeal.
In dividing the community estate in Gervin v. Gervin 4O4 the trial court
ordered the husband to pay his wife's attorney's and accountant's fees, and
the husband challenged the property divisions as divesting his separate property interests and as excessive with respect to the fees. The parties then remarried, though the husband maintained his appeal. Over a strong dissent
by the chief justice, the San Antonio court of appeals dismissed the appeal as
moot but affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the fees. 405 As Chief Justice Cadena pointed out, none of the case should have been treated as
396. Id, at 161; cf.May v. May, 716 S.W.2d 705, 712 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no

writ), in which it was said that the trial court might award all community pension benefits to
the pensioner-husband and order him to pay his wife a monetary amount in lieu of her interest.
397. 720 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
398. Id. at 272-73.
399. 719 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).

400. Id. at 225, 228-29.
401. 722 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).

402. Id. at 18.
403. Id.
404. 720 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
405. Id. at 151-52.
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mootA° 6 The judgment of the trial court had become final. To say that the
rights of the parties were the same as before the divorce was inaccurate. But
if that was so, how might the question as to fees be treated differently? In a
sense, other parties (the attorney and the accountant) were involved, but
without the division of property to support the award of fees as an element
of the property-division, the claimants should have proved up their claims as
necessaries. It is very unlikely that they did so.
In Abrams v. Abrams 4° 7 a nice distinction was drawn between the handling of attorney's fees in a property division and other property subject to
division. In Carle v. Carle4°8 the Texas Supreme Court held that an award
of attorney's fees is an integral part of the division of property between divorcing spouses and, further, that a spouse's acceptance of benefits is a bar to
appeal concerning the property division. 4° 9 Even so, the Corpus Christi
court of appeals held in Abrams that an appeal of attorney's fees should not
be affected by the rule as to enjoyment of benefits if the rest of the property
division is not questioned. 410 In that the award of attorney's fees related to a
division of the community property, it is difficult to understand how the
award of attorney's fees could be dealt with independently.
Clarificationand Enforcement. The 1983 provisions of the Family Code enacted to ease the process of enforcement of divorce decrees 411 are designed to
give ready access to the court for clarification of a prior order and its prompt
execution. A modification of a decree may not be achieved by this process,
and a jury trial is, therefore, not provided for.41 2 For example, in McDowell
v. McDowell 41 3 the trial court's order provided for sale of the family home
on the occurrence of any one of four events. Because none of these situations had occurred, the order was beyond the court's power of immediate
enforcement. 41 4 Similarly, the appellate court held in Griffith v. Griffith 415
that the trial court could not impose new burdens on the ex-spouses' real
property not anticipated by the decree. 4 16 On the other hand, because the
divorce decree in Griffith provided that the ex-husband should maintain his
former wife as beneficiary of his army benefit plan, it was appropriate that he
should be required to redesignate his ex-wife as beneficiary of the plan and to
417
pay annual premiums so that the plan would not lapse.
406. Id. at 152-53 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
407. 713 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
408. 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1950); see Dehnert v. Dehnert, 705 S.W.2d 849, 851
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
409. 149 Tex. at 472, 234 S.W.2d at 1004. If the recipient has been the victim of fraud,
however, the benefits doctrine is inapplicable. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 713 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
410. 713 S.W.2d at 198.
411. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.70-.77 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
412. Garza v. Garza, 713 S.W.2d 123, 126-27 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
413. 705 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
414. Id. at 346-47.
415. 698 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
416. Id. at 732.
417. Id. at 731-32.
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In McEntire v. McEntire4 18 an agreed judgment had been entered providing that each spouse would execute any instrument necessary to give effect to
the decree; further, the judgment ordered the husband to pay a particular
note due to a third person. Although it was not clear whether the note was
in existence at the time the decree was entered, it was consistent with the
parties' agreement that the ex-husband should be ordered to execute a note
to that person.

4 19

If the divorce decree fails to divide particular community property, the
matter is beyond the enforcement powers of the divorce court, and a new
suit must be brought for partition of the community property that had become a tenancy in common between the former spouses. In Dunn v.
Dunn,420 for example, the divorce court had failed to deal with the husband's civil service retirement benefits by merely awarding him property that
was in his possession. 42 ' The court seems incorrect, however, in saying that
the divorce court had failed to divide the proceeds of the sale of certain
livestock that the husband had sold in fraud of the wife's rights during the
pendency of the suit, because the decree disposed of the rest of the property
on hand. 422 If the husband had violated the provisions of section 3.57423 of

the Family Code in giving good title to community property in fraud of the
wife's rights, entry of the decree should not affect her suit for fraud.
In Binkley v. Wade 424 the divorce court awarded the husband particular
items of personalty on the basis of the spouses' agreement, but issued no
order for delivery. Afterwards the ex-husband unsuccessfully sought delivery of the property by way of a motion for clarification. He was nevertheless
allowed to pursue the same end by a new suit.42 5 Thus, the prior motion for

was not res judicata to a subsequent assertion of his property
clarification
6
rights.

42

Other Post-DivorceDisputes. The strict standards for maintaining a successful bill of review tend to limit that course of post-divorce relief. 427 In
Borgerdingv. Griffin,428 for example, both ex-spouses filed petitions for bills
of review to set aside a divorce decree. The ex-wife later dismissed her petition and the ex-husband failed to establish extrinsic fraud on the part of his
429
ex-wife with respect to marital assets that he asserted had been secreted.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

706 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
Id. at 351.
703 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.

423. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.57 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
424. 703 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
425. Id. at 324.
426. Id.
427. In a recent nonfamily case the Texas Supreme Court reversed an attempt by the San
Antonio court of appeals to loosen the requirements for maintaining a bill of review. Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Tex. 1987), rev'g 705 S.W.2d 288
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986).
428. 716 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
429. Id. at 698-99.
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In bringing her bill of review in Yates v. YateS4 30 the ex-wife sought unsuccessfully to rely on her attorney's unintentional (or negligent) acts beyond
those authorized by his client. 431 In Arndt v. Arndt 4 3 2 the petitioner did not
allege fraudulent concealment of assets, but that he was induced to agree to
the decree while suffering from acute alcoholism. Further, at the pre-trial
hearing he was unable to show that he would be able to prove a meritorious
defense. His attack was thus directed merely to the divorce court's exercise
of discretion in the division of property. Even if the court could have conas
strued his being induced to sign the decree without consulting an attorney
4 33
a fraud, he would still have failed in meeting bill-of-review standards.
In Towne v. Towne 4 34 the ex-wife sought to impose a constructive trust on
the proceeds of a Veterans' Administration life insurance policy of which the
second wife of the ex-husband was named as beneficiary. In a property settlement agreement entered into prior to their divorce the spouses had agreed
that the wife would own the life insurance policy, though the husband had
secretly designated his wife-to-be as the beneficiary. In upholding the trial
court's imposition of a constructive trust on all of the proceeds in favor of
the first wife, the Fort Worth court of appeals was at great pains to distinguish Ridgway v. Ridgway, 435 in which the United States Supreme Court had
held that a constructive trust fixed on the proceeds of a similar life insurance
policy by a Maine divorce court would not prevail over the right of the insured under federal law to change the beneficiary of the policy. 43 6 The Fort
Worth court distinguished Ridgway on the ground that the insured husband
in that case was dealing with property over which he had exclusive ownership, whereas in Towne he was attempting to divest the ex-wife of her community property interest when he made the beneficiary designation and
maintained it contrary to the property settlement agreement that was later
incorporated in the decree of the divorce court. 437 However much one
would like to distinguish the authority of the Ridgway case, this effort cannot be regarded as wholly successful, because it does not account for the
imposition of the constructive trust on the ex-husband's share of the proceeds. Whether the other spouse proves the managing spouse's actual intent
to defraud, or proves a constructive fraud demonstrated by the managing
spouse's unreasonable designation of a third person as the beneficiary of the
other spouse's community interest, the other spouse is not able to recover
the managing spouse's share of the community proceeds. 438 To distinguish
Ridgway effectively its authority must be acknowledged and then confined.
The United States Supreme Court held in Ridgway that a state court is pow430. 714 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).

431. Id. at 67.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

714 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
Id. at 88.
707 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
454 U.S. 46 (1981).
Id. at 61-63.

437. Towne, 707 S.W.2d at 748.
438. Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 370-72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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439
erless to restrain the insured from changing the beneficiary of his policy,

and the earlier Supreme Court holding in Wissner v. Wissner" ° had given
him the power to deal with his spouse's community interest as well. 44 But
neither of these authorities purports to allow the policy-holder to rescind his
contract with his ex-wife to maintain her as beneficiary (and indeed owner)
of the policy when he had entered into the contractual settlement to gain
benefits from the other spouse. Making a secret designation of his wife-to-be
as beneficiary prior to entering into the contractual settlement does indeed
smack of fraud. In this context the ex-wife can rely on the Supreme Court's
decision in Yiatchos v. Yiatchos 442 in which the3 court precluded the use of
federal law to justify a fraud under state law."

Once again an ex-husband sought to upset the award of a divorce court by
4
becoming a voluntary bankrupt under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. "
In denying the serviceman-ex-husband relief from the court order partitioning his military retirement benefits, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that the effect of the divorce decree was to partition a share of the benefits to
the ex-wife as her separate property. 44 5 Hence, there was no debt of the
bankrupt to be discharged. The court did not cite In re Nunnally446 in its
opinion. This is a neat solution to a vexing problem that avoids any discussion of the meaning of section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. 44 7 In In re

Benich, 448 however, the wife had agreed to surrender her community property rights in the husband's pension benefits in return for the husband's
agreement to pay her a portion thereof for her support. The court was
forced to rely on Nunnally to declare that the husband's duty to carry out
his obligations under the property settlement agreement were not dischargable in bankruptcy. 449

439. 454 U.S. at 60; see Kamel v. Kamel, 721 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no
writ), discussed supra notes 329-331.
440. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
441. Id. at 658-59.
442. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).

443. Id. at 309.
444.
445.
446.
447.

In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 557.
506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West Pam. Supp. 1986). For a discussion of less successful
efforts toward solutions of the problem, see J. McKNIGHT & W. REPPY, TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 278-79 (1983); McKnight, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 57, at 49-50.

448. 811 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1987).
449. Id. at 945-46.

